0120b874b2
- release-must-update-app-version.md: reframe around AppSource's actual
strict full-version-ordering requirement; scope branching-policy
claims as team convention, not platform rule.
- pictures-must-use-media-not-blob.md: MediaSet is a collection of
independent media objects, not automatic image variants/thumbnails.
- log-writes-must-survive-rollback.{md,good.al}: StartSession's only
data channel into the new session is its Record parameter to a
TableNo-scoped codeunit; a setter called on a local instance before
starting the session populates nothing in the new session.
- exposed-objects-must-be-in-a-permission-set.md: correct the three
exposure mechanisms (Web Services config, PageType/QueryType=API,
ServiceEnabled as a method-only attribute).
- pages-must-not-contain-business-logic.md: scope to persisted
mutations and cross-entry-point rules; presentation-only
calculations and table-owned invariants are not violations.
- given-blocks-must-cover-full-precondition-chain.good.al: replace
invented LibrarySales calls with the real API
(CreateCustomer/CreateSalesOrderForCustomerNo/PostSalesDocument).
- test-feature-scenario-tags.{md,good.al}: move [SCENARIO] inside the
test procedure body to match the current BCApps corpus; keep
[FEATURE] at codeunit level per Microsoft's own documented option.
- ui-test-codeunit-naming.md: scope the _UT suffix and adjacent-ID
pairing as an explicit team convention, not a BCApps-wide standard.
- page-design-must-match-bc-page-type-conventions.md /
table-design-must-match-bc-table-type-conventions.md: Card's
single-key primary-key claim is a contextual heuristic, not a
mandatory constraint (Ship-to Address, Customer/Vendor Bank Account
are real composite-key Card pages); a Subsidiary table with its own
identity commonly gets List+Card, not Worksheet/Tabular.
- api-page-least-privilege-write-access.{md,good.al}: only page-placed
fields are ever exposed; set InsertAllowed/DeleteAllowed=false in the
good sample so a narrow field set can't still create/delete records.
- source-organized-by-feature-not-object-type.md,
test-one-when-per-test.md: scope as team/testing-design conventions,
not Microsoft platform requirements.
- upgrade-tag-logic-must-not-nest-deeply.md: add the Microsoft Learn
citation that already backs the two-level nesting limit.
- Wire the new articles into the testing/data-modeling/error-handling/
security/ui review skills' candidate-selection signals.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Every exposed object must belong to a permission set
Description
An object that is reachable from outside the app's own UI is only usable if it is also granted execute access through a permission set. Three distinct mechanisms make an object reachable this way, and each needs to be checked on its own terms: a page or query published through the Web Services configuration page; a custom REST endpoint declared with PageType = API / QueryType = API; or an individual codeunit method exposed with the [ServiceEnabled] attribute (a method-level attribute — it does not apply to pages or queries as a property). When such an object is left out of every permission set, it becomes both unusable (no caller, human or service, can reach it) and invisible in review: nobody deliberately decided who may call it. Exposure without a matching grant is not a safe default; it is an endpoint nobody is governing.
Best Practice
Give every exposed object an explicit execute entry (page "..." = X, query "..." = X) in a permission set shipped by the app. Route sensitive endpoints into a dedicated, non-default admin permission set so reaching them requires a deliberate grant rather than being included by default. If an object should never be reachable from outside the app, remove the exposure itself (drop PageType = API / ServiceEnabled) rather than leaving an orphaned endpoint with no permission-set membership.
See sample: exposed-objects-must-be-in-a-permission-set.good.al.
Anti Pattern
Granting access to the underlying table data while forgetting to grant execute access to the exposed page or query itself. The table looks fully covered by a permission set, but the API/service layer in front of it has no = X entry anywhere, so the endpoint silently fails for every caller even though the data permissions look complete.
See sample: exposed-objects-must-be-in-a-permission-set.bad.al.