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a9f3c50863
The previous LLM-generated knowledge files contained factual
hallucinations. The most visible was the claim that `FindFirst` /
`FindLast` "forces a full-table scan" on an unfiltered record - it does
not; those APIs return a single row via the current key.
Other inaccuracies the audit found and fixed:
* `FindSet(true)` was described as "taking a LockTable". The correct
upstream phrasing is that `FindSet(true)` sets
`ReadIsolation::UpdLock` on the read. UpdLock and LockTable are
related but distinct mechanisms.
* The list of production-scale tables had been invented beyond the
upstream source (e.g. "Detailed Cust. Ledg. Entry") without a
citation. The regenerated list matches the ten tables upstream lists
with their P95 row counts.
* `SetLoadFields` guidance had been augmented with an extra mechanism
claim ("the database resolves the filter using the index without
hydrating the value") not present in upstream.
Approach: full regeneration of `microsoft/knowledge/` from the six
upstream BCApps Code Review instruction files, with Microsoft Learn /
the AL language reference as a secondary source. Every claim in every
regenerated file is anchored to a verbatim upstream quote (or a Learn
URL); the audit trail lives in artifacts/trace-<domain>.json on the
session workspace.
The PR #11 transaction/error-handling cluster is preserved verbatim:
* performance/understand-implicit-transaction-boundary.md
* performance/codeunit-run-as-atomic-sub-operation.{md,good.al,bad.al}
* performance/codeunit-run-requires-prior-commit-inside-transaction.{md,good.al,bad.al}
* performance/use-tryfunction-for-error-catching-not-rollback.{md,good.al,bad.al}
* performance/avoid-commit-inside-loops.{md,good.al,bad.al}
* security/commitbehavior-attribute-scopes-explicit-commits.{md,good.al,bad.al}
* testing/transactionmodel-attribute-governs-test-transactions.{md,good.al,bad.al}
These articles already cite Microsoft Learn and were carefully
cross-referenced; the regeneration skips their topics rather than
duplicating them.
File counts after regeneration:
performance 35 .md (5 preserved + 30 new)
privacy 17 .md
security 18 .md (1 preserved + 17 new)
style 33 .md
testing 1 .md (preserved)
ui 19 .md
upgrade 18 .md
Total 141 atomic knowledge files, each strictly one rule. All pass
.github/scripts/validate_frontmatter.py with 0 errors and 0 warnings.
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
22 lines
2.1 KiB
Markdown
22 lines
2.1 KiB
Markdown
---
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bc-version: [all]
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domain: security
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keywords: [isolatedstorage, datascope, module, company, user, scope]
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technologies: [al]
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countries: [w1]
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application-area: [all]
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---
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# Pick the right IsolatedStorage DataScope for the secret's lifetime
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## Description
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`IsolatedStorage` read and write methods take a `DataScope` parameter that decides which slice of storage the value belongs to. The choice is not a stylistic one — it changes which callers, in which company and under which user, can read the value back. Two scopes cover the common cases for app-level secrets: `DataScope::Module` stores the value once for the whole extension, isolated to that extension on the tenant — the right scope for app-specific secrets such as a global API key or service account. `DataScope::Company` stores the value per company, so each company on the tenant has its own slot — the right scope for company-specific secrets such as a per-company webhook URL or a per-company integration token. A per-user scope also exists for values that belong to an individual user.
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## Best Practice
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Choose `Module` when the secret is the same for every company and every user under the extension (a single tenant-wide API key). Choose `Company` when each company has its own integration credentials. Choose the user scope only when the secret is genuinely per-user. Use the same `DataScope` value on `Set`/`SetEncrypted`, `Get`, `Contains`, and `Delete` for the same key — mixing scopes for the same logical secret produces silent "not found" results. See sample: `isolatedstorage-datascope-module-vs-company.good.al`.
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## Anti Pattern
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Defaulting every call to `DataScope::Module` regardless of intent — storing a per-company webhook URL under `Module` means every company on the tenant shares the same URL. Or the inverse: storing a tenant-wide API key under `Company` means each company-switch effectively loses the key. Reviewers should look for cross-method inconsistency (`Set` under `Module`, `Get` under `Company`) and for scope choices that contradict the value's documented lifetime. See sample: `isolatedstorage-datascope-module-vs-company.bad.al`.
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