mirror of
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a9f3c50863
The previous LLM-generated knowledge files contained factual
hallucinations. The most visible was the claim that `FindFirst` /
`FindLast` "forces a full-table scan" on an unfiltered record - it does
not; those APIs return a single row via the current key.
Other inaccuracies the audit found and fixed:
* `FindSet(true)` was described as "taking a LockTable". The correct
upstream phrasing is that `FindSet(true)` sets
`ReadIsolation::UpdLock` on the read. UpdLock and LockTable are
related but distinct mechanisms.
* The list of production-scale tables had been invented beyond the
upstream source (e.g. "Detailed Cust. Ledg. Entry") without a
citation. The regenerated list matches the ten tables upstream lists
with their P95 row counts.
* `SetLoadFields` guidance had been augmented with an extra mechanism
claim ("the database resolves the filter using the index without
hydrating the value") not present in upstream.
Approach: full regeneration of `microsoft/knowledge/` from the six
upstream BCApps Code Review instruction files, with Microsoft Learn /
the AL language reference as a secondary source. Every claim in every
regenerated file is anchored to a verbatim upstream quote (or a Learn
URL); the audit trail lives in artifacts/trace-<domain>.json on the
session workspace.
The PR #11 transaction/error-handling cluster is preserved verbatim:
* performance/understand-implicit-transaction-boundary.md
* performance/codeunit-run-as-atomic-sub-operation.{md,good.al,bad.al}
* performance/codeunit-run-requires-prior-commit-inside-transaction.{md,good.al,bad.al}
* performance/use-tryfunction-for-error-catching-not-rollback.{md,good.al,bad.al}
* performance/avoid-commit-inside-loops.{md,good.al,bad.al}
* security/commitbehavior-attribute-scopes-explicit-commits.{md,good.al,bad.al}
* testing/transactionmodel-attribute-governs-test-transactions.{md,good.al,bad.al}
These articles already cite Microsoft Learn and were carefully
cross-referenced; the regeneration skips their topics rather than
duplicating them.
File counts after regeneration:
performance 35 .md (5 preserved + 30 new)
privacy 17 .md
security 18 .md (1 preserved + 17 new)
style 33 .md
testing 1 .md (preserved)
ui 19 .md
upgrade 18 .md
Total 141 atomic knowledge files, each strictly one rule. All pass
.github/scripts/validate_frontmatter.py with 0 errors and 0 warnings.
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
22 lines
1.8 KiB
Markdown
22 lines
1.8 KiB
Markdown
---
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bc-version: [all]
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domain: security
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keywords: [integrationevent, eventsubscriber, secrets, credentials, publisher]
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technologies: [al]
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countries: [w1]
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application-area: [all]
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---
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# Do not pass credentials or secrets through IntegrationEvent parameters
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## Description
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`[IntegrationEvent]` publishes a hook that any extension can subscribe to. Every parameter of the event signature is visible to every subscriber — including `var` parameters, which subscribers can both read and modify. A publisher that includes an API key, password, bearer token, or other secret in the event signature hands that secret to every subscriber on the tenant, including subscribers in extensions the publisher has no relationship with. There is no permission or partner-only filter that limits who may subscribe.
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## Best Practice
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Restrict event payloads to the non-sensitive context a subscriber legitimately needs: the business record being processed (a `Customer`), the operation being performed, an `IsHandled` flag that lets a subscriber skip the default behaviour, and a mutable payload object whose contents the publisher controls. Authentication is handled by the publisher before or after the event, never inside the parameters. See sample: `integrationevent-must-not-expose-secrets.good.al`.
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## Anti Pattern
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`[IntegrationEvent(false, false)] procedure OnBeforeSendRequest(var ApiKey: Text; var Password: Text; var RequestUrl: Text)` — any extension on the tenant can subscribe, read `ApiKey` and `Password`, and persist them elsewhere. Reviewers should flag any event parameter whose name or type suggests a secret (`ApiKey`, `Token`, `Password`, `Secret`, `Credential`, `SecretText` — even `SecretText` should not flow through an event surface). See sample: `integrationevent-must-not-expose-secrets.bad.al`.
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