bcquality/microsoft/knowledge/security/follow-least-privilege-in-permission-sets.md
Jesper Schulz-Wedde 9a4198eb28 Add [all] sentinel to bc-version; apply to version-agnostic knowledge
Most of the corpus — FindSet/SetLoadFields/CalcFields patterns, permission
sets, SingleInstance codeunits, DataClassification, IsolatedStorage,
transaction scope, SecretText — describes BC platform behaviour that is
identical across supported versions. The seed [26..28] range on every
file implied a version-specificity the content does not actually have,
and there was no way to express "applies to every version" in the
schema the way [w1] and [all] already do for countries and
application-area.

Extend the v1 schema with a universal sentinel for bc-version, parallel
to the sentinels already defined for the other dimensions:

  bc-version: [all]         # applies to every BC version

[all] is mutually exclusive with explicit versions. Range shorthand
([26..28]) and explicit lists ([26, 27, 28]) continue to work for files
genuinely tied to a version-gated API or deprecation.

Update read.md (field definition, matching semantics, partial-context
rule), write.md (default to [all], use ranges only with a concrete
reason), README.md (frontmatter example), and the CI validator. All
forty existing knowledge files and the three action skills convert to
[all]; none of the current content is version-gated. Validator passes.
2026-04-23 16:00:03 +02:00

1.6 KiB

bc-version domain keywords technologies countries application-area
all
security
permissionset
least-privilege
rimd
tabledata
al
w1
all

Follow least privilege in permission sets

Seed article. Converted from an existing security-review prompt to bootstrap the BCQuality security corpus. Domain stewards should expand, restructure, and refine as needed.

Description

Permission sets define the tabledata and object rights granted to every user or role assigned to them. A permission set that grants RIMD on tabledata * hands every caller full control over every table the extension exposes, which is never the shape of access any real role requires. Over-broad permission sets are a persistent source of privilege-escalation risk: once assigned, they are rarely audited.

Best Practice

Enumerate the specific tabledata objects a role needs and grant only the letters (R, I, M, D) that role genuinely uses. A sales order-entry role typically needs RIM on Sales Header, RIMD on Sales Line, and R on Customer — not blanket RIMD. Permission sets SHOULD be granular and role-shaped; a single permission set that covers every role in an extension is a design smell.

See sample: follow-least-privilege-in-permission-sets.good.al.

Anti Pattern

Granting tabledata * = RIMD (or any wildcard with I, M, or D) in a permission set. This bypasses any meaningful separation of duties the extension could enforce and gives unreviewed code paths the ability to insert, modify, and delete on any table.

See sample: follow-least-privilege-in-permission-sets.bad.al.