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Most of the corpus — FindSet/SetLoadFields/CalcFields patterns, permission sets, SingleInstance codeunits, DataClassification, IsolatedStorage, transaction scope, SecretText — describes BC platform behaviour that is identical across supported versions. The seed [26..28] range on every file implied a version-specificity the content does not actually have, and there was no way to express "applies to every version" in the schema the way [w1] and [all] already do for countries and application-area. Extend the v1 schema with a universal sentinel for bc-version, parallel to the sentinels already defined for the other dimensions: bc-version: [all] # applies to every BC version [all] is mutually exclusive with explicit versions. Range shorthand ([26..28]) and explicit lists ([26, 27, 28]) continue to work for files genuinely tied to a version-gated API or deprecation. Update read.md (field definition, matching semantics, partial-context rule), write.md (default to [all], use ranges only with a concrete reason), README.md (frontmatter example), and the CI validator. All forty existing knowledge files and the three action skills convert to [all]; none of the current content is version-gated. Validator passes.
29 lines
1.5 KiB
Markdown
29 lines
1.5 KiB
Markdown
---
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bc-version: [all]
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domain: security
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keywords: [event, publisher, extensibility, var-parameter]
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technologies: [al]
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countries: [w1]
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application-area: [all]
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---
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# Do not expose sensitive data in event publishers
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> **Seed article.** Converted from an existing security-review prompt to bootstrap the BCQuality security corpus. Domain stewards should expand, restructure, and refine as needed.
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## Description
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Events in AL are extensibility contracts. Every subscriber — third-party, internal, or installed after the fact — receives the full set of event parameters. Parameters that carry secrets, pre-authorization state, or variables the publisher relies on for access control effectively become public, and var-parameters can be mutated by a subscriber to alter publisher behaviour.
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## Best Practice
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Design event signatures to carry only the data a subscriber legitimately needs. Do not pass SecretText, credential material, or flags the publisher depends on for access control. If a subscriber needs to veto an action, model it as a separate OnBefore event whose Handled pattern is documented — not as a general-purpose var Boolean callers can flip.
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See sample: `do-not-expose-sensitive-data-in-event-publishers.good.al`.
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## Anti Pattern
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An OnBeforeElevateAccess publisher that exposes `var CanAccess: Boolean` — any subscriber installed on the tenant can flip it to true and escalate. Or a publisher that passes a SecretText parameter it obtained internally, handing it to every subscriber.
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See sample: `do-not-expose-sensitive-data-in-event-publishers.bad.al`.
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