bcquality/microsoft/knowledge/security/do-not-grant-rights-beyond-a-users-entitlement.md
Jesper Schulz-Wedde bfda67a95a
Promote security knowledge from community to Microsoft layer (#49)
* Promote security knowledge from community to Microsoft layer

Pure git-mv relocation of the SECURITY domain from the community layer to the Microsoft layer. No content changes.

Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>

* Address review feedback on security knowledge promotion

- do-not-grant-rights-beyond-a-users-entitlement.md: drop the See sample
  reference to a .good.al file that does not exist
- Remove the 'Contributions welcome' boilerplate line from
  compose-permission-sets, prefer-oauth2, and protect-sensitive-data
- protect-sensitive-data-in-temporary-tables: remove the pointless
  DeleteAll on the locally scoped temp buffer in the good sample and
  reword Best Practice to note local buffers are cleaned up automatically
- Drop guard-bulk-operations-with-istemporary from the promotion; it
  stays in the community layer pending a decision on whether it is security

Co-authored-by: Copilot App <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>

* Remove Contributions welcome boilerplate from do-not-grant article for consistency

Co-authored-by: Copilot App <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Jesper Schulz-Wedde <jesper.schulzwedde@microsoft.com>
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-07-14 11:23:57 +02:00

1.5 KiB

bc-version domain keywords technologies countries application-area
all
security
entitlement
permissionset
license
clipping
sandbox-drift
al
w1
all

Do not grant rights beyond a user's entitlement

Description

Entitlements are license-level caps on what a user can access, derived automatically from the BC license tier. Permission sets are application-level grants administered on top of the entitlement. A permission set can only grant within the entitlement's boundaries; grants beyond those boundaries are silently clipped at runtime. This means a permission set authored and validated in a developer sandbox (with a broad license) can appear to work correctly there and fail silently in a customer tenant where users hold a narrower entitlement.

Best Practice

When designing a permission set that ships with an extension, consult the entitlement model for the target user population before finalizing the grants. Every object and tabledata right the set expects to grant should be reachable within the intended entitlement tier; if it is not, the set needs to be scoped to licenses that permit it, or the feature needs a different access path.

Anti Pattern

Authoring permission sets in a sandbox with full-license context and shipping them without verifying which entitlement tier customer users actually hold. The sets look complete in test; on a real customer they silently lose rights at runtime and the symptom is "the feature does not work for some users" with no obvious authorization error.