mirror of
https://github.com/microsoft/BCQuality.git
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a9f3c50863
The previous LLM-generated knowledge files contained factual
hallucinations. The most visible was the claim that `FindFirst` /
`FindLast` "forces a full-table scan" on an unfiltered record - it does
not; those APIs return a single row via the current key.
Other inaccuracies the audit found and fixed:
* `FindSet(true)` was described as "taking a LockTable". The correct
upstream phrasing is that `FindSet(true)` sets
`ReadIsolation::UpdLock` on the read. UpdLock and LockTable are
related but distinct mechanisms.
* The list of production-scale tables had been invented beyond the
upstream source (e.g. "Detailed Cust. Ledg. Entry") without a
citation. The regenerated list matches the ten tables upstream lists
with their P95 row counts.
* `SetLoadFields` guidance had been augmented with an extra mechanism
claim ("the database resolves the filter using the index without
hydrating the value") not present in upstream.
Approach: full regeneration of `microsoft/knowledge/` from the six
upstream BCApps Code Review instruction files, with Microsoft Learn /
the AL language reference as a secondary source. Every claim in every
regenerated file is anchored to a verbatim upstream quote (or a Learn
URL); the audit trail lives in artifacts/trace-<domain>.json on the
session workspace.
The PR #11 transaction/error-handling cluster is preserved verbatim:
* performance/understand-implicit-transaction-boundary.md
* performance/codeunit-run-as-atomic-sub-operation.{md,good.al,bad.al}
* performance/codeunit-run-requires-prior-commit-inside-transaction.{md,good.al,bad.al}
* performance/use-tryfunction-for-error-catching-not-rollback.{md,good.al,bad.al}
* performance/avoid-commit-inside-loops.{md,good.al,bad.al}
* security/commitbehavior-attribute-scopes-explicit-commits.{md,good.al,bad.al}
* testing/transactionmodel-attribute-governs-test-transactions.{md,good.al,bad.al}
These articles already cite Microsoft Learn and were carefully
cross-referenced; the regeneration skips their topics rather than
duplicating them.
File counts after regeneration:
performance 35 .md (5 preserved + 30 new)
privacy 17 .md
security 18 .md (1 preserved + 17 new)
style 33 .md
testing 1 .md (preserved)
ui 19 .md
upgrade 18 .md
Total 141 atomic knowledge files, each strictly one rule. All pass
.github/scripts/validate_frontmatter.py with 0 errors and 0 warnings.
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
22 lines
1.5 KiB
Markdown
22 lines
1.5 KiB
Markdown
---
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bc-version: [all]
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domain: privacy
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keywords: [page, card, list, api, listpart, permission-system, display, ui-dialog]
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technologies: [al]
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countries: [w1]
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application-area: [all]
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---
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# Displaying fields on a page (or in a UI dialog) is not a privacy concern
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## Description
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Every page in Business Central — `Card`, `List`, `API`, `ListPart`, request pages — renders data to an authenticated user who has been granted permission to see it. The BC permission system, not the page definition, controls who sees what; once a user is permissioned to a table, displaying any field of that table is normal business functionality. The same logic extends to `Message`, `Notification` and `Confirm` dialogs: the signed-in user already has access to the data the dialog is showing them. Privacy review for pages and dialogs is therefore the wrong layer — the actionable findings live on the underlying data (table-field classification, telemetry message text, outbound HTTP consent), not on the UI.
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## Best Practice
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When asked "is it OK to show this email/name/employee code on this page?", the answer is yes — provided the user has permission to the underlying record. Drive privacy concerns to the data layer (classification, telemetry, external transfer) rather than the UI layer.
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## Anti Pattern
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Flagging an API page, list, card, or notification for surfacing customer-bearing fields (`E-Mail`, `Name`, `Phone No.`, audit fields, `User ID`). The permission system governs visibility; the page does not.
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