bcquality/microsoft/knowledge/security/al-has-no-built-in-htmlencode.md
Jesper Schulz-Wedde a9f3c50863 Regenerate microsoft/knowledge from upstream BCApps instructions
The previous LLM-generated knowledge files contained factual
hallucinations. The most visible was the claim that `FindFirst` /
`FindLast` "forces a full-table scan" on an unfiltered record - it does
not; those APIs return a single row via the current key.

Other inaccuracies the audit found and fixed:

* `FindSet(true)` was described as "taking a LockTable". The correct
  upstream phrasing is that `FindSet(true)` sets
  `ReadIsolation::UpdLock` on the read. UpdLock and LockTable are
  related but distinct mechanisms.
* The list of production-scale tables had been invented beyond the
  upstream source (e.g. "Detailed Cust. Ledg. Entry") without a
  citation. The regenerated list matches the ten tables upstream lists
  with their P95 row counts.
* `SetLoadFields` guidance had been augmented with an extra mechanism
  claim ("the database resolves the filter using the index without
  hydrating the value") not present in upstream.

Approach: full regeneration of `microsoft/knowledge/` from the six
upstream BCApps Code Review instruction files, with Microsoft Learn /
the AL language reference as a secondary source. Every claim in every
regenerated file is anchored to a verbatim upstream quote (or a Learn
URL); the audit trail lives in artifacts/trace-<domain>.json on the
session workspace.

The PR #11 transaction/error-handling cluster is preserved verbatim:

* performance/understand-implicit-transaction-boundary.md
* performance/codeunit-run-as-atomic-sub-operation.{md,good.al,bad.al}
* performance/codeunit-run-requires-prior-commit-inside-transaction.{md,good.al,bad.al}
* performance/use-tryfunction-for-error-catching-not-rollback.{md,good.al,bad.al}
* performance/avoid-commit-inside-loops.{md,good.al,bad.al}
* security/commitbehavior-attribute-scopes-explicit-commits.{md,good.al,bad.al}
* testing/transactionmodel-attribute-governs-test-transactions.{md,good.al,bad.al}

These articles already cite Microsoft Learn and were carefully
cross-referenced; the regeneration skips their topics rather than
duplicating them.

File counts after regeneration:

  performance   35 .md  (5 preserved + 30 new)
  privacy       17 .md
  security      18 .md  (1 preserved + 17 new)
  style         33 .md
  testing        1 .md  (preserved)
  ui            19 .md
  upgrade       18 .md

Total 141 atomic knowledge files, each strictly one rule. All pass
.github/scripts/validate_frontmatter.py with 0 errors and 0 warnings.

Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-05-21 09:53:09 +02:00

1.7 KiB

bc-version domain keywords technologies countries application-area
all
security
html
xss
encoding
htmlencode
injection
email
al
w1
all

AL has no built-in HtmlEncode — encode HTML output by hand or avoid it

Description

AL does not ship a built-in HtmlEncode (or equivalent) function. Code that builds an HTML fragment — an email body, a report header, a chart label rendered as HTML — by concatenating record-field values into a string is therefore unencoded by default, and any <, >, &, or " in the user content is interpreted as markup by the receiving renderer. The result is cross-site scripting in the recipient's mail client, browser, or report viewer. The absence of a built-in encoder is non-obvious to anyone used to platforms where HtmlEncode is a one-liner.

Best Practice

Replace the four characters by hand before concatenating user content into HTML: &&amp; first, then <&lt;, >&gt;, "&quot;. Centralize the substitution in one helper so every HTML producer in the extension uses the same encoder. Better still, do not build raw HTML at all — use a structured format (JSON for an API payload, a report layout for a printed document) and let the renderer do the encoding. See sample: al-has-no-built-in-htmlencode.good.al.

Anti Pattern

HtmlContent := '<div>Welcome ' + UserName + '!</div>' — any record-field value or user input concatenated directly into an HTML string. Reviewers should flag any string concatenation whose right-hand operand is a field, a parameter, or any non-literal value, and whose surrounding context contains HTML tags (<, </, <br, <table, <a href=). See sample: al-has-no-built-in-htmlencode.bad.al.