bcquality/microsoft/knowledge/security/isolatedstorage-access-must-be-local-or-internal.md
Jesper Schulz-Wedde a9f3c50863 Regenerate microsoft/knowledge from upstream BCApps instructions
The previous LLM-generated knowledge files contained factual
hallucinations. The most visible was the claim that `FindFirst` /
`FindLast` "forces a full-table scan" on an unfiltered record - it does
not; those APIs return a single row via the current key.

Other inaccuracies the audit found and fixed:

* `FindSet(true)` was described as "taking a LockTable". The correct
  upstream phrasing is that `FindSet(true)` sets
  `ReadIsolation::UpdLock` on the read. UpdLock and LockTable are
  related but distinct mechanisms.
* The list of production-scale tables had been invented beyond the
  upstream source (e.g. "Detailed Cust. Ledg. Entry") without a
  citation. The regenerated list matches the ten tables upstream lists
  with their P95 row counts.
* `SetLoadFields` guidance had been augmented with an extra mechanism
  claim ("the database resolves the filter using the index without
  hydrating the value") not present in upstream.

Approach: full regeneration of `microsoft/knowledge/` from the six
upstream BCApps Code Review instruction files, with Microsoft Learn /
the AL language reference as a secondary source. Every claim in every
regenerated file is anchored to a verbatim upstream quote (or a Learn
URL); the audit trail lives in artifacts/trace-<domain>.json on the
session workspace.

The PR #11 transaction/error-handling cluster is preserved verbatim:

* performance/understand-implicit-transaction-boundary.md
* performance/codeunit-run-as-atomic-sub-operation.{md,good.al,bad.al}
* performance/codeunit-run-requires-prior-commit-inside-transaction.{md,good.al,bad.al}
* performance/use-tryfunction-for-error-catching-not-rollback.{md,good.al,bad.al}
* performance/avoid-commit-inside-loops.{md,good.al,bad.al}
* security/commitbehavior-attribute-scopes-explicit-commits.{md,good.al,bad.al}
* testing/transactionmodel-attribute-governs-test-transactions.{md,good.al,bad.al}

These articles already cite Microsoft Learn and were carefully
cross-referenced; the regeneration skips their topics rather than
duplicating them.

File counts after regeneration:

  performance   35 .md  (5 preserved + 30 new)
  privacy       17 .md
  security      18 .md  (1 preserved + 17 new)
  style         33 .md
  testing        1 .md  (preserved)
  ui            19 .md
  upgrade       18 .md

Total 141 atomic knowledge files, each strictly one rule. All pass
.github/scripts/validate_frontmatter.py with 0 errors and 0 warnings.

Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-05-21 09:53:09 +02:00

22 lines
1.8 KiB
Markdown

---
bc-version: [all]
domain: security
keywords: [isolatedstorage, local, internal, public, getter, setter, encapsulation]
technologies: [al]
countries: [w1]
application-area: [all]
---
# Procedures that read or write IsolatedStorage must not be public
## Description
`IsolatedStorage` partitions its data by extension: values written by one extension are unreadable to another. That guarantee assumes the owning extension does not voluntarily expose its storage through a public API. A `public` procedure on a codeunit that calls `IsolatedStorage.Get`, `IsolatedStorage.Set`, `IsolatedStorage.SetEncrypted`, `IsolatedStorage.Contains`, or `IsolatedStorage.Delete` defeats the isolation: any other extension on the same tenant can call that procedure and obtain (or overwrite) the secret. The platform's per-extension boundary becomes a per-procedure boundary, and there is no per-procedure boundary.
## Best Practice
Mark every procedure that touches `IsolatedStorage` as `local` (visible only inside its containing object) or `internal` (visible only inside the owning extension). Provide consumers with a narrow, intent-specific API — for example, "send notification to configured webhook" rather than "give me the webhook secret." See sample: `isolatedstorage-access-must-be-local-or-internal.good.al`.
## Anti Pattern
A public `GetApiKey()` returning the stored value, or a public `SetApiKey(NewKey: Text)` that calls `IsolatedStorage.SetEncrypted`. Both turn the extension into a confused deputy that hands out (or accepts overwrites of) its own secrets on behalf of any caller on the tenant. Reviewers should flag any procedure whose body references `IsolatedStorage` and whose declaration omits `local` or `internal`. See sample: `isolatedstorage-access-must-be-local-or-internal.bad.al`.