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Ports 14 concern-sized articles (8 performance, 6 security) and 25
AL samples from BC Code Intelligence, restructured to BCQuality's v1
schema and layered under /community/knowledge/. Each article is
atomic, under 100 lines, and ships <slug>.good.al and (where the
pattern has a clear anti-example) <slug>.bad.al siblings.
Jesper's microsoft-layer leaves (al-performance-review and
al-security-review) source across every enabled layer via
*/knowledge/<domain>/**, so these additions are picked up by the
existing action skills without any new skill definitions.
Performance (8):
- use-deleteall-for-filtered-bulk-deletion
- call-setloadfields-before-filters
- load-common-fields-before-branching-on-case
- load-only-primary-key-fields-for-reference-work
- omit-filter-only-fields-from-setloadfields
- choose-maintainsiftindex-by-read-write-ratio
- avoid-growing-globals-in-singleinstance-subscribers
- order-case-branches-by-frequency
Security (6):
- classify-every-field-with-dataclassification
- protect-sensitive-data-in-temporary-tables
- guard-bulk-operations-with-istemporary
- compose-permission-sets-with-included-sets
- do-not-grant-rights-beyond-a-users-entitlement
- prefer-oauth2-over-api-keys-for-external-http-calls
Graveyard-bound items (not ported; to be captured in a later
/docs/triage-graveyard.md):
- testfield-performance (soft guidance, low actionability)
- table-event-batch-operation-impact (keep-event-subscribers-lightweight
already carries the core insight)
- Most of /roger-reviewer (AL formatting - frontier-model territory)
- sift-technology-fundamentals (descriptive, not a citable concern)
- bc-telemetry-buddy-* (tooling promotion, not guidance)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
28 lines
1.6 KiB
Markdown
28 lines
1.6 KiB
Markdown
---
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bc-version: [26..28]
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domain: security
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keywords: [temporary-table, data-protection, permission, cleanup]
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technologies: [al]
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countries: [w1]
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application-area: [all]
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---
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# Protect sensitive data in temporary tables
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> **Seed article.** Ported from BC Code Intelligence to seed the community corpus. Community contributors are invited to expand or refine.
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## Description
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A temporary record copies data out of the source table into session memory. The platform does not automatically enforce the source table's permission model on the copy, and a value written to a temporary buffer can outlive the procedure that put it there if the buffer is a global or is passed upward. Code that places sensitive rows into a temporary table is therefore responsible for the checks and cleanup the source table would otherwise provide.
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## Best Practice
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Validate the caller's read permission on the source table before populating the temporary buffer. Keep the buffer's lifetime as short as the work requires, and delete its contents on every exit path — including error paths — so sensitive values do not linger. Prefer local temporary variables over globals for anything carrying sensitive data.
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See sample: `protect-sensitive-data-in-temporary-tables.good.al`.
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## Anti Pattern
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Copying records into a temporary buffer without a preceding permission check, and relying on procedure-exit to clean up. An exception before the explicit cleanup leaves the data in the buffer; a global or var-parameter buffer carries the data back to callers that may have no right to see it.
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See sample: `protect-sensitive-data-in-temporary-tables.bad.al`.
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