mirror of
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a9f3c50863
The previous LLM-generated knowledge files contained factual
hallucinations. The most visible was the claim that `FindFirst` /
`FindLast` "forces a full-table scan" on an unfiltered record - it does
not; those APIs return a single row via the current key.
Other inaccuracies the audit found and fixed:
* `FindSet(true)` was described as "taking a LockTable". The correct
upstream phrasing is that `FindSet(true)` sets
`ReadIsolation::UpdLock` on the read. UpdLock and LockTable are
related but distinct mechanisms.
* The list of production-scale tables had been invented beyond the
upstream source (e.g. "Detailed Cust. Ledg. Entry") without a
citation. The regenerated list matches the ten tables upstream lists
with their P95 row counts.
* `SetLoadFields` guidance had been augmented with an extra mechanism
claim ("the database resolves the filter using the index without
hydrating the value") not present in upstream.
Approach: full regeneration of `microsoft/knowledge/` from the six
upstream BCApps Code Review instruction files, with Microsoft Learn /
the AL language reference as a secondary source. Every claim in every
regenerated file is anchored to a verbatim upstream quote (or a Learn
URL); the audit trail lives in artifacts/trace-<domain>.json on the
session workspace.
The PR #11 transaction/error-handling cluster is preserved verbatim:
* performance/understand-implicit-transaction-boundary.md
* performance/codeunit-run-as-atomic-sub-operation.{md,good.al,bad.al}
* performance/codeunit-run-requires-prior-commit-inside-transaction.{md,good.al,bad.al}
* performance/use-tryfunction-for-error-catching-not-rollback.{md,good.al,bad.al}
* performance/avoid-commit-inside-loops.{md,good.al,bad.al}
* security/commitbehavior-attribute-scopes-explicit-commits.{md,good.al,bad.al}
* testing/transactionmodel-attribute-governs-test-transactions.{md,good.al,bad.al}
These articles already cite Microsoft Learn and were carefully
cross-referenced; the regeneration skips their topics rather than
duplicating them.
File counts after regeneration:
performance 35 .md (5 preserved + 30 new)
privacy 17 .md
security 18 .md (1 preserved + 17 new)
style 33 .md
testing 1 .md (preserved)
ui 19 .md
upgrade 18 .md
Total 141 atomic knowledge files, each strictly one rule. All pass
.github/scripts/validate_frontmatter.py with 0 errors and 0 warnings.
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
22 lines
1.9 KiB
Markdown
22 lines
1.9 KiB
Markdown
---
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bc-version: [all]
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domain: security
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keywords: [secrettext, credentials, api-key, token, debugger, unwrap]
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technologies: [al]
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countries: [w1]
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application-area: [all]
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---
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# Use SecretText for credentials, API keys, and tokens
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## Description
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`SecretText` is the AL data type for values that should never appear in a debugger session, in a log, or in a variable watch. The compiler enforces two guarantees: a string literal cannot be assigned directly to a `SecretText` variable, and a `SecretText` cannot be assigned back to a `Text` or `Code` without an explicit `Unwrap` call. Together these prevent the two common accidents — embedding a secret in source code, and quietly converting a secret to plain text where the debugger can read it. Use `SecretText` for parameters, return values, and local variables that carry API keys, tokens, passwords, connection strings, or any other value an attacker with debugger access should not see.
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## Best Practice
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Declare credential-carrying parameters and variables as `SecretText` from the call site that retrieves the secret all the way to the call site that consumes it (typically an `HttpClient` header or URI). Never round-trip through `Text` — every conversion is a potential exposure point. Retrieve secrets from `IsolatedStorage` with the `SecretText` overload of `Get` rather than the `Text` overload. See sample: `secrettext-for-credentials.good.al`.
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## Anti Pattern
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Holding a credential in a `Text` variable (`BearerToken: Text`), concatenating it into a header, then passing it to `HttpClient`. The token is visible in the debugger and in any error that prints the variable, and the compiler offers no help because the type was wrong from the start. Reviewers should flag any local or parameter named like a secret (`ApiKey`, `Token`, `Password`, `ClientSecret`) whose type is `Text` or `Code`. See sample: `secrettext-for-credentials.bad.al`.
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