3842ef7138
- log-writes-must-survive-rollback.good.al: fixed invalid trigger OnRun(var Rec: ...) declaration; Rec is implicit when TableNo is set. - exposed-objects-must-be-in-a-permission-set.md: distinguished the three exposure mechanisms (page/query web service or API, codeunit published as a web service, [ServiceEnabled] bound action on a page) and their actual permission targets (page/query "..." = X vs codeunit "..." = X). - code-must-not-change-workdate.md: scoped from an absolute "never" to "not as a side effect of unrelated logic" - verified real WorkDate(x) setter usage in BCApps demo-data generators and test codeunits. - bcpt-scenarios-must-be-app-specific.md: SingleInstance and StartScenario/EndScenario reframed as context-dependent patterns, not mandatory requirements - BCPT Create Customer uses neither. - test-feature-scenario-tags.good.al/.bad.al: replaced the invented LibrarySales.CreateCustomerWithPrice/"Item Price Mgt." calls with a real, verified price-list-line test using Library - Sales/Library - Inventory/ Library - Price Calculation. - page-design-must-match-bc-page-type-conventions.md: scoped the missing UsageCategory anti-pattern to pages intended as searchable entry points. - defensive-vs-offensive-code-must-match-blast-radius.md/.good.al/.bad.al: replaced the VAT registration number "low blast radius" example with a genuinely cosmetic field (customer home page URL). - source-organized-by-feature-not-object-type.md: anti-pattern reframed as inconsistency with a repo's own convention, not the object-type scheme itself. - pictures-must-use-media-not-blob.md: removed leftover "image variants" wording contradicting the already-corrected MediaSet description. Proactively fixed while sweeping all fixtures for invented APIs: - given-blocks-must-cover-full-precondition-chain.bad.al: PostSalesOrder called with wrong arity and referenced an undeclared variable. - ui-test-codeunit-naming.good.al/.bad.al: replaced the same fake "Item Price Mgt."/TestPage "Item Price" with real Library - Sales calls and the real Customer Card TestPage. Worklist completeness: added review-skill cues for the 12 of 18 new rules that had none (al-appsource-review.md, al-data-modeling-review.md, al-error-handling-review.md, al-security-review.md, al-style-review.md x3, al-testing-review.md x2, al-ui-review.md, al-upgrade-review.md, al-web-services-review.md), and fixed test-feature-scenario-tags' cue, which only matched the compliant (tagged) shape instead of the anti-pattern (untagged/generic-named test). Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Every exposed object must belong to a permission set
Description
An object that is reachable from outside the app's own UI is only usable if it is also granted execute access through a permission set. Three distinct mechanisms make an object reachable this way, each with its own permission target:
- A page or query published through the Web Services configuration page, or a custom REST endpoint declared with
PageType = API/QueryType = API— both need apage "..." = X/query "..." = Xentry for that object. - A codeunit published through Web Services exposes every public procedure on it as an OData/SOAP operation automatically — there is no per-method attribute to add. The permission target is the codeunit itself:
codeunit "..." = X. [ServiceEnabled]is a method-level attribute used on a page procedure to expose it as an OData v4 bound action (for example aPostaction on an invoice page) — it does not apply to pages, queries, or codeunits as an object-level property, and it does not create its own permission target. The action is still a call into that page object, so the page's ownpage "..." = Xentry is what governs it.
When such an object is left out of every permission set, it becomes both unusable (no caller, human or service, can reach it) and invisible in review: nobody deliberately decided who may call it. Exposure without a matching grant is not a safe default; it is an endpoint nobody is governing.
Best Practice
Give every exposed object an explicit execute entry in a permission set shipped by the app: page "..." = X / query "..." = X for a published or API page/query (including one that exposes a [ServiceEnabled] bound action), and codeunit "..." = X for a codeunit published as a web service. Route sensitive endpoints into a dedicated, non-default admin permission set so reaching them requires a deliberate grant rather than being included by default. If an object should never be reachable from outside the app, remove the exposure itself (drop PageType = API / the Web Services registration) rather than leaving an orphaned endpoint with no permission-set membership.
See sample: exposed-objects-must-be-in-a-permission-set.good.al.
Anti Pattern
Granting access to the underlying table data while forgetting to grant execute access to the exposed page or query itself. The table looks fully covered by a permission set, but the API/service layer in front of it has no = X entry anywhere, so the endpoint silently fails for every caller even though the data permissions look complete.
See sample: exposed-objects-must-be-in-a-permission-set.bad.al.