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9a4198eb28
Most of the corpus — FindSet/SetLoadFields/CalcFields patterns, permission sets, SingleInstance codeunits, DataClassification, IsolatedStorage, transaction scope, SecretText — describes BC platform behaviour that is identical across supported versions. The seed [26..28] range on every file implied a version-specificity the content does not actually have, and there was no way to express "applies to every version" in the schema the way [w1] and [all] already do for countries and application-area. Extend the v1 schema with a universal sentinel for bc-version, parallel to the sentinels already defined for the other dimensions: bc-version: [all] # applies to every BC version [all] is mutually exclusive with explicit versions. Range shorthand ([26..28]) and explicit lists ([26, 27, 28]) continue to work for files genuinely tied to a version-gated API or deprecation. Update read.md (field definition, matching semantics, partial-context rule), write.md (default to [all], use ranges only with a concrete reason), README.md (frontmatter example), and the CI validator. All forty existing knowledge files and the three action skills convert to [all]; none of the current content is version-gated. Validator passes.
29 lines
1.5 KiB
Markdown
29 lines
1.5 KiB
Markdown
---
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bc-version: [all]
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domain: security
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keywords: [secrets, credentials, hardcoded, label, apikey]
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technologies: [al]
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countries: [w1]
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application-area: [all]
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---
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# Never hardcode secrets in AL
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> **Seed article.** Converted from an existing security-review prompt to bootstrap the BCQuality security corpus. Domain stewards should expand, restructure, and refine as needed.
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## Description
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A secret embedded in AL source — API key, password, connection string, token — lives forever: in the app package, in source control history, in every debugger session that sees the assignment, and in any log that captures the containing variable. Rotation is effectively impossible without a new release, and the blast radius covers every tenant the extension is installed in.
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## Best Practice
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Retrieve secrets at runtime from a protected store: Azure Key Vault for production workloads (see prefer-azure-key-vault-for-production-secrets) or IsolatedStorage for tenant-local encrypted values (see use-isolated-storage-for-module-and-company-secrets). Carry the retrieved value in a SecretText variable end-to-end (see use-secrettext-for-credentials).
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See sample: `never-hardcode-secrets-in-al.good.al`.
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## Anti Pattern
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Assigning a secret literal to a Text, Code, or Label variable (including labels marked as constants). The secret is now part of the compiled app and indistinguishable from non-sensitive content to callers and tools.
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See sample: `never-hardcode-secrets-in-al.bad.al`.
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