bcquality/microsoft/knowledge/security/internal-access-is-not-a-security-boundary.md
Jesper Schulz-Wedde 186d8a1314
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Complete AL review knowledge readiness (#108)
* Complete AL review knowledge readiness

Fill telemetry and Query coverage, strengthen thin review domains, correct audited content defects, and add deterministic cheap-model evaluation and reference-integrity safeguards.

Co-authored-by: Copilot App <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>

Copilot-Session: 9825b012-e653-496a-9310-c1f4b6f8ac27

* Generalize review fixture discovery

Derive smoke cases from the leaf, domain, and paired-sample conventions so new leaves require no scoring-contract changes. Keep only exceptional selection/context overrides and fail when retrieval metadata cannot rank the selected article.

Co-authored-by: Copilot App <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>

Copilot-Session: 9825b012-e653-496a-9310-c1f4b6f8ac27

* Preserve published field IDs in sample

Keep the existing Email and Contact Email field IDs unchanged, clarify that the sample represents an independent baseline, and use a local breaking-change rule for the generic smoke evaluation.

Co-authored-by: Copilot App <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>

Copilot-Session: 9825b012-e653-496a-9310-c1f4b6f8ac27

* Clarify published field identity rules

State explicitly that a published field keeps its ID, name, and type while a replacement is added as a separate field under an unused ID.

Co-authored-by: Copilot App <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>

Copilot-Session: 9825b012-e653-496a-9310-c1f4b6f8ac27

* Align field obsoletion sample baselines

Use Email field ID 3 as the shared baseline so the bad example demonstrates a same-ID rename while the good example retains the original field and adds a separate replacement.

Co-authored-by: Copilot App <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>

Copilot-Session: 9825b012-e653-496a-9310-c1f4b6f8ac27

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Co-authored-by: Jesper Schulz-Wedde <jesper.schulzwedde@microsoft.com>
2026-07-15 10:55:25 +02:00

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---
bc-version: [all]
domain: security
keywords: [access, internal, internalsvisibleto, recordref, codeunit-run, security-boundary, authorization]
technologies: [al]
countries: [w1]
application-area: [all]
---
# Access Internal is API hygiene, not an authorization boundary
## Description
`Access = Internal` controls compile-time symbol visibility. It does not prevent runtime access through mechanisms such as `RecordRef`, `TransferFields`, or `Codeunit.Run`, and `internalsVisibleTo` deliberately grants compile-time access to named companion apps. Microsoft explicitly documents that access modifiers cannot be used as a security boundary.
## Best Practice
Use `internal` to keep implementation details out of the supported API, but enforce sensitive operations with permissions, entitlements, and explicit authorization checks appropriate to the operation. Treat `internalsVisibleTo` as a same-publisher development/testability relationship, not as a trust grant for secrets or elevated data access.
See sample: `internal-access-is-not-a-security-boundary.good.al`.
## Anti Pattern
Placing privileged work in an internal codeunit and claiming that other extensions cannot invoke it, or exposing an app to a different publisher through `internalsVisibleTo` because `internal` is assumed to protect the underlying operation. The access modifier narrows supported callers; it does not authenticate runtime callers.
See sample: `internal-access-is-not-a-security-boundary.bad.al`.