a9f3c50863
The previous LLM-generated knowledge files contained factual
hallucinations. The most visible was the claim that `FindFirst` /
`FindLast` "forces a full-table scan" on an unfiltered record - it does
not; those APIs return a single row via the current key.
Other inaccuracies the audit found and fixed:
* `FindSet(true)` was described as "taking a LockTable". The correct
upstream phrasing is that `FindSet(true)` sets
`ReadIsolation::UpdLock` on the read. UpdLock and LockTable are
related but distinct mechanisms.
* The list of production-scale tables had been invented beyond the
upstream source (e.g. "Detailed Cust. Ledg. Entry") without a
citation. The regenerated list matches the ten tables upstream lists
with their P95 row counts.
* `SetLoadFields` guidance had been augmented with an extra mechanism
claim ("the database resolves the filter using the index without
hydrating the value") not present in upstream.
Approach: full regeneration of `microsoft/knowledge/` from the six
upstream BCApps Code Review instruction files, with Microsoft Learn /
the AL language reference as a secondary source. Every claim in every
regenerated file is anchored to a verbatim upstream quote (or a Learn
URL); the audit trail lives in artifacts/trace-<domain>.json on the
session workspace.
The PR #11 transaction/error-handling cluster is preserved verbatim:
* performance/understand-implicit-transaction-boundary.md
* performance/codeunit-run-as-atomic-sub-operation.{md,good.al,bad.al}
* performance/codeunit-run-requires-prior-commit-inside-transaction.{md,good.al,bad.al}
* performance/use-tryfunction-for-error-catching-not-rollback.{md,good.al,bad.al}
* performance/avoid-commit-inside-loops.{md,good.al,bad.al}
* security/commitbehavior-attribute-scopes-explicit-commits.{md,good.al,bad.al}
* testing/transactionmodel-attribute-governs-test-transactions.{md,good.al,bad.al}
These articles already cite Microsoft Learn and were carefully
cross-referenced; the regeneration skips their topics rather than
duplicating them.
File counts after regeneration:
performance 35 .md (5 preserved + 30 new)
privacy 17 .md
security 18 .md (1 preserved + 17 new)
style 33 .md
testing 1 .md (preserved)
ui 19 .md
upgrade 18 .md
Total 141 atomic knowledge files, each strictly one rule. All pass
.github/scripts/validate_frontmatter.py with 0 errors and 0 warnings.
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
2.1 KiB
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Storing GetLastErrorText() in table fields is a privacy finding, not a security finding
Description
It is tempting to flag any code that calls GetLastErrorText() and writes the result into a table field (or displays it to end users) as a security issue, on the assumption that the error text might leak credentials or system internals. In Business Central, that pattern is treated as a privacy concern instead: AL Error text frequently contains customer content (record keys, field values, document numbers) rather than infrastructure details, and the appropriate review owner is the privacy/DataClassification reviewer. A security reviewer should not raise a finding for GetLastErrorText() storage on the grounds that it might expose secrets; that risk is covered elsewhere by the rules that prevent secrets from appearing in error messages in the first place (see secrettext-for-credentials.md).
Best Practice
When auditing AL changes for security, ignore patterns where GetLastErrorText() is captured into a table or shown to users — leave those to the privacy review. Security findings on error text should be limited to the construction of the Error() call itself: secrets, paths, or technical internals being interpolated into the error before it is raised. See sample: getlasterrortext-storage-is-privacy-not-security.bad.al for the pattern that is not a security finding.
Anti Pattern
Filing a security finding such as "GetLastErrorText() stored in field — potential information disclosure" against AL code that captures an error for later inspection. The finding is in the wrong domain and crowds out the actual security signal. The mirror anti-pattern is silencing genuine Error('... %1 ...', SecretValue) constructions on the grounds that "error text is privacy" — those are security findings because they create the leak, regardless of where the text ends up afterwards.