0980397d27
Converts Jesper's existing AL security-review prompt into BCQuality seed
knowledge articles so the al-security-review leaf has a real corpus to
match against. Mirrors the performance seed phase.
Articles under microsoft/knowledge/security/ (16):
- Permission model: follow-least-privilege-in-permission-sets,
use-indirect-permissions-for-elevated-access,
use-inherent-permissions-to-grant-minimal-access
- Secrets: never-hardcode-secrets-in-al,
use-isolated-storage-for-module-and-company-secrets,
prefer-azure-key-vault-for-production-secrets,
use-secrettext-for-credentials, use-secrettext-with-httpclient,
compose-secrets-with-secretstrsubstno,
use-nondebuggable-when-parsing-secrets
- External calls: require-https-for-external-calls,
set-timeouts-for-external-calls, do-not-put-credentials-in-urls
- Error handling: avoid-sensitive-data-in-error-messages,
do-not-swallow-security-errors-silently
- Extensibility: do-not-expose-sensitive-data-in-event-publishers
Paired AL samples under samples/security/<slug>/{bad,good}.al, object
IDs 50200-50231 (no overlap with performance 50100-50140).
Rubber-duck findings addressed:
- HttpClient secret-URI: SetSecretRequestUri is on HttpRequestMessage
(not HttpClient). Rewrote use-secrettext-with-httpclient and its
good sample to use HttpRequestMessage + HttpClient.Send.
- InherentPermissions only grants access to same-extension objects;
the sample now defines its own table 50230 "Sec Sample Lookup" and
grants 'r' on that, not on Database::Customer.
- Reworked compose-secrets-with-secretstrsubstno bad.al away from
Format(SecretText) (unreliable) to a plain Text+StrSubstNo anti-
pattern.
- Moved normative guidance out of Description in three articles
(compose-secrets-..., prefer-azure-key-vault-..., use-inherent-...)
so it sits in Best Practice / Anti Pattern per READ contract.
- Added a companion helper codeunit (50231) to the indirect-permissions
good sample so it actually demonstrates the controlled write path.
- Rebuilt the event-publisher good/bad pair on the same ExportCustomer
scenario so the contrast is the shape of the event signature, not a
different event.
Also: broaden samples/README.md object-ID range note to 50100-50299.
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
1.6 KiB
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Use indirect permissions for elevated access
Seed article. Converted from an existing security-review prompt to bootstrap the BCQuality security corpus. Domain stewards should expand, restructure, and refine as needed.
Description
Indirect permissions (ri, ii, mi, di) let a procedure perform an operation against tabledata the caller does not have direct rights to, provided the caller is authorized to invoke the procedure. They are the supported mechanism for elevation: instead of widening every caller's direct rights to M or D, the sensitive operation lives in a codeunit that holds the indirect right and validates its callers.
Best Practice
Where a module exposes a controlled write or delete against a sensitive table, grant the codeunit (or the helper permission set it assumes) the indirect permission (mi, di) it requires, keep direct permissions minimal, and document why the elevation is justified. The helper MUST validate its inputs and the caller's identity before performing the elevated work.
See sample: samples/security/use-indirect-permissions-for-elevated-access/good.al.
Anti Pattern
Granting direct M or D on a sensitive tabledata to every role that might invoke a helper, because authoring an indirect-permission codeunit was inconvenient. Every caller now has the elevated right for every code path, not just the one the helper implements.
See sample: samples/security/use-indirect-permissions-for-elevated-access/bad.al.