bcquality/microsoft/knowledge/security/isolatedstorage-setencrypted-for-sensitive-values.md
Jesper Schulz-Wedde a9f3c50863 Regenerate microsoft/knowledge from upstream BCApps instructions
The previous LLM-generated knowledge files contained factual
hallucinations. The most visible was the claim that `FindFirst` /
`FindLast` "forces a full-table scan" on an unfiltered record - it does
not; those APIs return a single row via the current key.

Other inaccuracies the audit found and fixed:

* `FindSet(true)` was described as "taking a LockTable". The correct
  upstream phrasing is that `FindSet(true)` sets
  `ReadIsolation::UpdLock` on the read. UpdLock and LockTable are
  related but distinct mechanisms.
* The list of production-scale tables had been invented beyond the
  upstream source (e.g. "Detailed Cust. Ledg. Entry") without a
  citation. The regenerated list matches the ten tables upstream lists
  with their P95 row counts.
* `SetLoadFields` guidance had been augmented with an extra mechanism
  claim ("the database resolves the filter using the index without
  hydrating the value") not present in upstream.

Approach: full regeneration of `microsoft/knowledge/` from the six
upstream BCApps Code Review instruction files, with Microsoft Learn /
the AL language reference as a secondary source. Every claim in every
regenerated file is anchored to a verbatim upstream quote (or a Learn
URL); the audit trail lives in artifacts/trace-<domain>.json on the
session workspace.

The PR #11 transaction/error-handling cluster is preserved verbatim:

* performance/understand-implicit-transaction-boundary.md
* performance/codeunit-run-as-atomic-sub-operation.{md,good.al,bad.al}
* performance/codeunit-run-requires-prior-commit-inside-transaction.{md,good.al,bad.al}
* performance/use-tryfunction-for-error-catching-not-rollback.{md,good.al,bad.al}
* performance/avoid-commit-inside-loops.{md,good.al,bad.al}
* security/commitbehavior-attribute-scopes-explicit-commits.{md,good.al,bad.al}
* testing/transactionmodel-attribute-governs-test-transactions.{md,good.al,bad.al}

These articles already cite Microsoft Learn and were carefully
cross-referenced; the regeneration skips their topics rather than
duplicating them.

File counts after regeneration:

  performance   35 .md  (5 preserved + 30 new)
  privacy       17 .md
  security      18 .md  (1 preserved + 17 new)
  style         33 .md
  testing        1 .md  (preserved)
  ui            19 .md
  upgrade       18 .md

Total 141 atomic knowledge files, each strictly one rule. All pass
.github/scripts/validate_frontmatter.py with 0 errors and 0 warnings.

Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-05-21 09:53:09 +02:00

1.7 KiB

bc-version domain keywords technologies countries application-area
all
security
isolatedstorage
setencrypted
encryption
secret
storage
al
w1
all

Prefer IsolatedStorage.SetEncrypted over Set for sensitive values

Description

IsolatedStorage exposes two write entry points: Set stores the value as-is, and SetEncrypted stores it encrypted at rest. Both are scoped per extension, but only SetEncrypted adds the additional protection that the value is not readable from the underlying storage by anything that bypasses the AL IsolatedStorage API. The choice between them is by intent: configuration that is not sensitive (a user preference, a default flag) can use Set; anything that would harm the tenant if leaked — API keys, tokens, connection strings, OAuth client secrets — uses SetEncrypted.

Best Practice

Use IsolatedStorage.SetEncrypted for every value that meets the definition of a secret. Pair it with the matching retrieval pattern: IsolatedStorage.Contains to test for presence and IsolatedStorage.Get (preferably with a SecretText destination) to read. Constrain the input length before storing — long values can exceed the encrypted-storage size limit and the write will fail at runtime. See sample: isolatedstorage-setencrypted-for-sensitive-values.good.al.

Anti Pattern

IsolatedStorage.Set('ApiKey', ApiKeyValue, DataScope::Module) — the key is now sitting in storage unencrypted, and any future incident that exposes the underlying storage exposes the key. Reviewers should flag any IsolatedStorage.Set whose key name or surrounding context suggests a secret (ApiKey, Token, Password, Secret, ClientSecret). See sample: isolatedstorage-setencrypted-for-sensitive-values.bad.al.