bcquality/microsoft/knowledge/security/secrets-isolated-storage.md
Jesper Schulz-Wedde 186d8a1314
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Complete AL review knowledge readiness (#108)
* Complete AL review knowledge readiness

Fill telemetry and Query coverage, strengthen thin review domains, correct audited content defects, and add deterministic cheap-model evaluation and reference-integrity safeguards.

Co-authored-by: Copilot App <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>

Copilot-Session: 9825b012-e653-496a-9310-c1f4b6f8ac27

* Generalize review fixture discovery

Derive smoke cases from the leaf, domain, and paired-sample conventions so new leaves require no scoring-contract changes. Keep only exceptional selection/context overrides and fail when retrieval metadata cannot rank the selected article.

Co-authored-by: Copilot App <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>

Copilot-Session: 9825b012-e653-496a-9310-c1f4b6f8ac27

* Preserve published field IDs in sample

Keep the existing Email and Contact Email field IDs unchanged, clarify that the sample represents an independent baseline, and use a local breaking-change rule for the generic smoke evaluation.

Co-authored-by: Copilot App <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>

Copilot-Session: 9825b012-e653-496a-9310-c1f4b6f8ac27

* Clarify published field identity rules

State explicitly that a published field keeps its ID, name, and type while a replacement is added as a separate field under an unused ID.

Co-authored-by: Copilot App <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>

Copilot-Session: 9825b012-e653-496a-9310-c1f4b6f8ac27

* Align field obsoletion sample baselines

Use Email field ID 3 as the shared baseline so the bad example demonstrates a same-ID rename while the good example retains the original field and adds a separate replacement.

Co-authored-by: Copilot App <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>

Copilot-Session: 9825b012-e653-496a-9310-c1f4b6f8ac27

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Co-authored-by: Jesper Schulz-Wedde <jesper.schulzwedde@microsoft.com>
2026-07-15 10:55:25 +02:00

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Markdown

---
bc-version: [all]
domain: security
keywords: [isolatedstorage, secrets, api-key, oauth-token, connection-string, table-field, credentials]
technologies: [al]
countries: [w1]
application-area: [all]
---
# A secret belongs in IsolatedStorage, never in a table field
## Description
API keys, OAuth tokens, client secrets, and connection strings must not be stored in an ordinary table `Text` field — not even on a hidden setup table. A regular field is exposed through record reads, page display, RapidStart and Excel export, report datasets, and surfaces in `DataClassification` review; anyone with table permission can read it. The correct home is `IsolatedStorage`, which is invisible to database queries, API pages, and configuration packages. The storage-*location* decision is the rule here; how to scope and encrypt the value once it is in IsolatedStorage is covered separately.
## Best Practice
Persist every credential in `IsolatedStorage`, write it at the point of capture, and read it only when needed. Prefer `SetEncrypted` when the value fits its documented length limit. On BC24 and later, carry the value through the `SecretText` overloads; on earlier releases, keep any required `Text` handling inside a `[NonDebuggable]` boundary. Choose the `DataScope` that matches the credential's lifetime. See `isolatedstorage-datascope-module-vs-company`, `isolatedstorage-setencrypted-for-sensitive-values`, and `secrettext-for-credentials` for those separate concerns.
See sample: `secrets-isolated-storage.good.al`.
## Anti Pattern
A "Setup" or "Connection" table carrying a `Text` field named `API Key`, `Password`, or `Client Secret`. The value is now readable by any object with table permission, ships in RapidStart packages and Excel exports, and appears in record snapshots — a credential disclosure that no amount of encryption-in-transit elsewhere makes up for. Reviewer signal: a secret-shaped field declared on a table instead of an `IsolatedStorage` call.
See sample: `secrets-isolated-storage.bad.al`.