mirror of
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a9f3c50863
The previous LLM-generated knowledge files contained factual
hallucinations. The most visible was the claim that `FindFirst` /
`FindLast` "forces a full-table scan" on an unfiltered record - it does
not; those APIs return a single row via the current key.
Other inaccuracies the audit found and fixed:
* `FindSet(true)` was described as "taking a LockTable". The correct
upstream phrasing is that `FindSet(true)` sets
`ReadIsolation::UpdLock` on the read. UpdLock and LockTable are
related but distinct mechanisms.
* The list of production-scale tables had been invented beyond the
upstream source (e.g. "Detailed Cust. Ledg. Entry") without a
citation. The regenerated list matches the ten tables upstream lists
with their P95 row counts.
* `SetLoadFields` guidance had been augmented with an extra mechanism
claim ("the database resolves the filter using the index without
hydrating the value") not present in upstream.
Approach: full regeneration of `microsoft/knowledge/` from the six
upstream BCApps Code Review instruction files, with Microsoft Learn /
the AL language reference as a secondary source. Every claim in every
regenerated file is anchored to a verbatim upstream quote (or a Learn
URL); the audit trail lives in artifacts/trace-<domain>.json on the
session workspace.
The PR #11 transaction/error-handling cluster is preserved verbatim:
* performance/understand-implicit-transaction-boundary.md
* performance/codeunit-run-as-atomic-sub-operation.{md,good.al,bad.al}
* performance/codeunit-run-requires-prior-commit-inside-transaction.{md,good.al,bad.al}
* performance/use-tryfunction-for-error-catching-not-rollback.{md,good.al,bad.al}
* performance/avoid-commit-inside-loops.{md,good.al,bad.al}
* security/commitbehavior-attribute-scopes-explicit-commits.{md,good.al,bad.al}
* testing/transactionmodel-attribute-governs-test-transactions.{md,good.al,bad.al}
These articles already cite Microsoft Learn and were carefully
cross-referenced; the regeneration skips their topics rather than
duplicating them.
File counts after regeneration:
performance 35 .md (5 preserved + 30 new)
privacy 17 .md
security 18 .md (1 preserved + 17 new)
style 33 .md
testing 1 .md (preserved)
ui 19 .md
upgrade 18 .md
Total 141 atomic knowledge files, each strictly one rule. All pass
.github/scripts/validate_frontmatter.py with 0 errors and 0 warnings.
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
22 lines
1.7 KiB
Markdown
22 lines
1.7 KiB
Markdown
---
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bc-version: [all]
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domain: security
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keywords: [isolatedstorage, setencrypted, encryption, secret, storage]
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technologies: [al]
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countries: [w1]
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application-area: [all]
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---
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# Prefer IsolatedStorage.SetEncrypted over Set for sensitive values
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## Description
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`IsolatedStorage` exposes two write entry points: `Set` stores the value as-is, and `SetEncrypted` stores it encrypted at rest. Both are scoped per extension, but only `SetEncrypted` adds the additional protection that the value is not readable from the underlying storage by anything that bypasses the AL `IsolatedStorage` API. The choice between them is by intent: configuration that is not sensitive (a user preference, a default flag) can use `Set`; anything that would harm the tenant if leaked — API keys, tokens, connection strings, OAuth client secrets — uses `SetEncrypted`.
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## Best Practice
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Use `IsolatedStorage.SetEncrypted` for every value that meets the definition of a secret. Pair it with the matching retrieval pattern: `IsolatedStorage.Contains` to test for presence and `IsolatedStorage.Get` (preferably with a `SecretText` destination) to read. Constrain the input length before storing — long values can exceed the encrypted-storage size limit and the write will fail at runtime. See sample: `isolatedstorage-setencrypted-for-sensitive-values.good.al`.
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## Anti Pattern
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`IsolatedStorage.Set('ApiKey', ApiKeyValue, DataScope::Module)` — the key is now sitting in storage unencrypted, and any future incident that exposes the underlying storage exposes the key. Reviewers should flag any `IsolatedStorage.Set` whose key name or surrounding context suggests a secret (`ApiKey`, `Token`, `Password`, `Secret`, `ClientSecret`). See sample: `isolatedstorage-setencrypted-for-sensitive-values.bad.al`.
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