Driven by a parity comparison between BCAppsBCQuality PR #27 and
BCAppsCampAIRHack PR #162 on byte-identical content:
| | BCQuality | AIRHack |
|--|--|--|
| Total findings | 6 | 10 |
| Performance | 0 | 4 |
| Security | 0 | 5 |
Standalone runs of al-security-review and al-performance-review against
the SAME diff produced the expected matches (rimd-on-read-only via
inherent-permissions-minimal-grant; redundant-Get via
avoid-redundant-get-when-record-already-loaded). The miss in the live
run is therefore not a knowledge-coverage gap and not a worklist
filtering issue. It is attention dilution inside the al-code-review
super-skill, which the model collapses into one rolled-up generation
pass on real-size PRs.
Changes:
microsoft/skills/review/al-code-review.md
- New 'Execution discipline (mandatory)' subsection in the Action step
that explicitly forbids collapsing leaves into one shared reasoning
pass and requires each sub-skill to walk its Source -> Relevance ->
Worklist -> Action steps as its own iteration before the next leaf
starts.
- Self-review pass is now described as the final, mandatory iteration
with a concrete candidate-category checklist (architecture-level
smells, error-handling gaps, magic constants, privacy/telemetry,
resource lifecycle). Returning zero agent findings on a real-size
diff is explicitly defined as a defect.
microsoft/skills/review/al-{security,performance,privacy,style,
upgrade,ui}-review.md
- Each leaf skill now states that when an unambiguous .good.al
companion exists, findings[].suggested-code should carry the
literal replacement for the source lines. Closes the
one-click-suggestion gap created when BCQ#19 only updated
al-code-review.
microsoft/knowledge/security/case-must-handle-unknown-enum-values.{md,
bad.al,
good.al}
- New article: case over a security-sensitive enum (Authentication
Type, Authorization Mode, Identity Provider, Permission Scope,
Encryption Algorithm) MUST have an else arm. Without it, an unknown
enum value silently falls through and the security context never
initialises. The bad sample is lifted from the SharePoint Graph
helper that triggered the parity finding.
microsoft/knowledge/performance/instream-length-unreliable-for-bc-
streams.{md,bad,good}
- New article: InStream.Length returns 0 / partial for HTTP-response
streams and some file-API streams, breaking size-threshold branching
in upload code. Bad sample is the simple-vs-chunked Graph upload
pattern; good sample materialises into a Temp Blob first.
Companion change: microsoft/BCAppsBCQuality#28 extends the
orchestrator's bootstrap prompt with the same per-iteration execution
discipline and adds a CI warning when a >5-file PR returns zero agent
findings (regression signal).
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
