Correct security and privacy guidance

Co-authored-by: Copilot App <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>

Copilot-Session: 9c2eebc4-dcd5-4b85-8113-90772d818900
This commit is contained in:
Jesper Schulz-Wedde 2026-07-14 10:45:42 +02:00
parent 7a678d1aff
commit ec8f891954
34 changed files with 189 additions and 150 deletions

View file

@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
---
bc-version: [all]
bc-version: [23..]
domain: security
keywords: [nondebuggable, attribute, secrettext, unwrap, debugger]
technologies: [al]
@ -7,16 +7,16 @@ countries: [w1]
application-area: [all]
---
# Mark procedures that call SecretText.Unwrap() as [NonDebuggable]
# On-premises only: protect unavoidable SecretText.Unwrap calls
## Description
`SecretText` transit — assignment, parameter passing, and return values — is auto-protected: the debugger sees a redacted placeholder, not the value. The protection ends the moment code calls `.Unwrap()`, which converts the `SecretText` back to plain `Text`. From that point on, the local variable holding the result is visible in the debugger like any other `Text`. The `[NonDebuggable]` attribute marks a procedure so that none of its locals or parameters are visible to the debugger during execution, which is exactly what is needed for any procedure that performs an `Unwrap()` or that otherwise materializes a secret as `Text` (for example, while parsing a JSON response to extract an access token).
`SecretText.Unwrap()` is supported only for Business Central on-premises and exists for compatibility. It converts a protected value to plain `Text`, where debugger redaction no longer applies. `[NonDebuggable]` prevents the debugger from inspecting a procedure's parameters and locals, but it does not make the resulting `Text` safe to return, log, or pass through debuggable code.
## Best Practice
Apply `[NonDebuggable]` to any procedure whose body calls `.Unwrap()` on a `SecretText`, and to any procedure that constructs a `SecretText` from a `Text` source (such as a procedure that reads a JSON response body and converts the resulting `Text` into a `SecretText` for the caller). Keep the unwrap window as small as possible — ideally a single one-line helper that hands the unwrapped value straight to the consuming API. See sample: `nondebuggable-required-when-unwrapping-secrettext.good.al`.
In SaaS, keep the value as `SecretText` and use secret-aware APIs instead of unwrapping. For an unavoidable on-premises legacy API that accepts only `Text`, keep the plain-text path as short as possible and mark every procedure in that path `[NonDebuggable]`. Do not return the unwrapped value. See sample: `nondebuggable-required-when-unwrapping-secrettext.good.al`.
## Anti Pattern
Calling `ApiKey.Unwrap()` inside a procedure that is not marked `[NonDebuggable]`. The unwrapped value is now an ordinary `Text` local and the debugger will display it, defeating the purpose of using `SecretText` in the first place. Reviewers should flag any `Unwrap()` call in a procedure that lacks the attribute, and any procedure that parses a credential out of a response (`access_token`, `id_token`, `client_secret`) without the attribute. See sample: `nondebuggable-required-when-unwrapping-secrettext.bad.al`.
Calling `Unwrap()` in cloud-targeted code, or calling it in an on-premises procedure that is debuggable or returns the resulting `Text`. Both defeat the protection that `SecretText` provides. See sample: `nondebuggable-required-when-unwrapping-secrettext.bad.al`.