Promote security knowledge from community to Microsoft layer (#49)

* Promote security knowledge from community to Microsoft layer

Pure git-mv relocation of the SECURITY domain from the community layer to the Microsoft layer. No content changes.

Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>

* Address review feedback on security knowledge promotion

- do-not-grant-rights-beyond-a-users-entitlement.md: drop the See sample
  reference to a .good.al file that does not exist
- Remove the 'Contributions welcome' boilerplate line from
  compose-permission-sets, prefer-oauth2, and protect-sensitive-data
- protect-sensitive-data-in-temporary-tables: remove the pointless
  DeleteAll on the locally scoped temp buffer in the good sample and
  reword Best Practice to note local buffers are cleaned up automatically
- Drop guard-bulk-operations-with-istemporary from the promotion; it
  stays in the community layer pending a decision on whether it is security

Co-authored-by: Copilot App <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>

* Remove Contributions welcome boilerplate from do-not-grant article for consistency

Co-authored-by: Copilot App <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Jesper Schulz-Wedde <jesper.schulzwedde@microsoft.com>
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
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Jesper Schulz-Wedde 2026-07-14 11:23:57 +02:00 committed by GitHub
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---
bc-version: [all]
domain: security
keywords: [entitlement, permissionset, license, clipping, sandbox-drift]
technologies: [al]
countries: [w1]
application-area: [all]
---
# Do not grant rights beyond a user's entitlement
## Description
Entitlements are license-level caps on what a user can access, derived automatically from the BC license tier. Permission sets are application-level grants administered on top of the entitlement. A permission set can only grant within the entitlement's boundaries; grants beyond those boundaries are silently clipped at runtime. This means a permission set authored and validated in a developer sandbox (with a broad license) can appear to work correctly there and fail silently in a customer tenant where users hold a narrower entitlement.
## Best Practice
When designing a permission set that ships with an extension, consult the entitlement model for the target user population before finalizing the grants. Every object and tabledata right the set expects to grant should be reachable within the intended entitlement tier; if it is not, the set needs to be scoped to licenses that permit it, or the feature needs a different access path.
## Anti Pattern
Authoring permission sets in a sandbox with full-license context and shipping them without verifying which entitlement tier customer users actually hold. The sets look complete in test; on a real customer they silently lose rights at runtime and the symptom is "the feature does not work for some users" with no obvious authorization error.