Regenerate microsoft/knowledge from upstream BCApps instructions

The previous LLM-generated knowledge files contained factual
hallucinations. The most visible was the claim that `FindFirst` /
`FindLast` "forces a full-table scan" on an unfiltered record - it does
not; those APIs return a single row via the current key.

Other inaccuracies the audit found and fixed:

* `FindSet(true)` was described as "taking a LockTable". The correct
  upstream phrasing is that `FindSet(true)` sets
  `ReadIsolation::UpdLock` on the read. UpdLock and LockTable are
  related but distinct mechanisms.
* The list of production-scale tables had been invented beyond the
  upstream source (e.g. "Detailed Cust. Ledg. Entry") without a
  citation. The regenerated list matches the ten tables upstream lists
  with their P95 row counts.
* `SetLoadFields` guidance had been augmented with an extra mechanism
  claim ("the database resolves the filter using the index without
  hydrating the value") not present in upstream.

Approach: full regeneration of `microsoft/knowledge/` from the six
upstream BCApps Code Review instruction files, with Microsoft Learn /
the AL language reference as a secondary source. Every claim in every
regenerated file is anchored to a verbatim upstream quote (or a Learn
URL); the audit trail lives in artifacts/trace-<domain>.json on the
session workspace.

The PR #11 transaction/error-handling cluster is preserved verbatim:

* performance/understand-implicit-transaction-boundary.md
* performance/codeunit-run-as-atomic-sub-operation.{md,good.al,bad.al}
* performance/codeunit-run-requires-prior-commit-inside-transaction.{md,good.al,bad.al}
* performance/use-tryfunction-for-error-catching-not-rollback.{md,good.al,bad.al}
* performance/avoid-commit-inside-loops.{md,good.al,bad.al}
* security/commitbehavior-attribute-scopes-explicit-commits.{md,good.al,bad.al}
* testing/transactionmodel-attribute-governs-test-transactions.{md,good.al,bad.al}

These articles already cite Microsoft Learn and were carefully
cross-referenced; the regeneration skips their topics rather than
duplicating them.

File counts after regeneration:

  performance   35 .md  (5 preserved + 30 new)
  privacy       17 .md
  security      18 .md  (1 preserved + 17 new)
  style         33 .md
  testing        1 .md  (preserved)
  ui            19 .md
  upgrade       18 .md

Total 141 atomic knowledge files, each strictly one rule. All pass
.github/scripts/validate_frontmatter.py with 0 errors and 0 warnings.

Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>

microsoft/knowledge/security/integrationevent-var-parameter-bypasses-security-guards.md

@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+---
+bc-version: [all]
+domain: security
+keywords: [integrationevent, var, guard, ishandled, bypass, security-check]
+technologies: [al]
+countries: [w1]
+application-area: [all]
+---
+
+# Do not expose security guards as `var` parameters on IntegrationEvent
+
+## Description
+
+A `var` parameter on an `[IntegrationEvent]` is a mutable hook: any subscriber can overwrite the value and the publisher will see the new value when control returns. That is the right shape for "let an extension contribute to a payload"; it is the wrong shape for "let an extension confirm a security decision". A `var HasAccess: Boolean` or `var SkipValidation: Boolean` lets any subscriber on the tenant flip the result of the publisher's permission check to `true` (or set "skip" to `true`) before the publisher reads it. The publisher's check becomes advisory, which is the same as not having a check.
+
+## Best Practice
+
+Keep the security decision inside the publisher, where it is not bypassable. Fire an `OnAfter*` informational event after the check completes, with the result passed by value (not `var`) so subscribers can react — log, audit, surface a warning — but cannot rewrite the outcome. When subscribers legitimately need to add their own checks, expose an `OnAfterCheckPermissions(...)` that can only tighten access (e.g., a subscriber can `Error()`), never loosen it. See sample: `integrationevent-var-parameter-bypasses-security-guards.good.al`.
+
+## Anti Pattern
+
+`OnBeforeCheckPermissions(var HasAccess: Boolean; var SkipValidation: Boolean; TableNo: Integer)`, followed in the caller by `if SkipValidation then exit;`. Any subscriber sets `SkipValidation := true` and the check is gone. Reviewers should flag any `IntegrationEvent` whose signature contains a `var Boolean` whose name reads like a security decision (`HasAccess`, `IsAllowed`, `SkipValidation`, `BypassCheck`, `IsAuthorized`). See sample: `integrationevent-var-parameter-bypasses-security-guards.bad.al`.