Regenerate microsoft/knowledge from upstream BCApps instructions

The previous LLM-generated knowledge files contained factual
hallucinations. The most visible was the claim that `FindFirst` /
`FindLast` "forces a full-table scan" on an unfiltered record - it does
not; those APIs return a single row via the current key.

Other inaccuracies the audit found and fixed:

* `FindSet(true)` was described as "taking a LockTable". The correct
  upstream phrasing is that `FindSet(true)` sets
  `ReadIsolation::UpdLock` on the read. UpdLock and LockTable are
  related but distinct mechanisms.
* The list of production-scale tables had been invented beyond the
  upstream source (e.g. "Detailed Cust. Ledg. Entry") without a
  citation. The regenerated list matches the ten tables upstream lists
  with their P95 row counts.
* `SetLoadFields` guidance had been augmented with an extra mechanism
  claim ("the database resolves the filter using the index without
  hydrating the value") not present in upstream.

Approach: full regeneration of `microsoft/knowledge/` from the six
upstream BCApps Code Review instruction files, with Microsoft Learn /
the AL language reference as a secondary source. Every claim in every
regenerated file is anchored to a verbatim upstream quote (or a Learn
URL); the audit trail lives in artifacts/trace-<domain>.json on the
session workspace.

The PR #11 transaction/error-handling cluster is preserved verbatim:

* performance/understand-implicit-transaction-boundary.md
* performance/codeunit-run-as-atomic-sub-operation.{md,good.al,bad.al}
* performance/codeunit-run-requires-prior-commit-inside-transaction.{md,good.al,bad.al}
* performance/use-tryfunction-for-error-catching-not-rollback.{md,good.al,bad.al}
* performance/avoid-commit-inside-loops.{md,good.al,bad.al}
* security/commitbehavior-attribute-scopes-explicit-commits.{md,good.al,bad.al}
* testing/transactionmodel-attribute-governs-test-transactions.{md,good.al,bad.al}

These articles already cite Microsoft Learn and were carefully
cross-referenced; the regeneration skips their topics rather than
duplicating them.

File counts after regeneration:

  performance   35 .md  (5 preserved + 30 new)
  privacy       17 .md
  security      18 .md  (1 preserved + 17 new)
  style         33 .md
  testing        1 .md  (preserved)
  ui            19 .md
  upgrade       18 .md

Total 141 atomic knowledge files, each strictly one rule. All pass
.github/scripts/validate_frontmatter.py with 0 errors and 0 warnings.

Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
This commit is contained in:
Jesper Schulz-Wedde 2026-05-21 09:53:09 +02:00
parent 613c4b4019
commit a9f3c50863
562 changed files with 6293 additions and 4869 deletions

View file

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---
bc-version: [all]
domain: privacy
keywords: [page, card, list, api, listpart, permission-system, display, ui-dialog]
technologies: [al]
countries: [w1]
application-area: [all]
---
# Displaying fields on a page (or in a UI dialog) is not a privacy concern
## Description
Every page in Business Central — `Card`, `List`, `API`, `ListPart`, request pages — renders data to an authenticated user who has been granted permission to see it. The BC permission system, not the page definition, controls who sees what; once a user is permissioned to a table, displaying any field of that table is normal business functionality. The same logic extends to `Message`, `Notification` and `Confirm` dialogs: the signed-in user already has access to the data the dialog is showing them. Privacy review for pages and dialogs is therefore the wrong layer — the actionable findings live on the underlying data (table-field classification, telemetry message text, outbound HTTP consent), not on the UI.
## Best Practice
When asked "is it OK to show this email/name/employee code on this page?", the answer is yes — provided the user has permission to the underlying record. Drive privacy concerns to the data layer (classification, telemetry, external transfer) rather than the UI layer.
## Anti Pattern
Flagging an API page, list, card, or notification for surfacing customer-bearing fields (`E-Mail`, `Name`, `Phone No.`, audit fields, `User ID`). The permission system governs visibility; the page does not.