Name the three required checks explicitly: response size, schema compliance, content integrity

Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>

microsoft/knowledge/security/validate-unauthenticated-response-before-use.md

@@ -11,11 +11,11 @@ application-area: [all]
 
 ## Description
 
-When AL calls an external endpoint that does not authenticate *itself* to the client, the response is fully attacker-influenceable — cleartext MITM, a spoofed or compromised host, DNS/redirect games, or simply a misbehaving public service. Recognizing that a call is unauthenticated is the first review step, and the signals are BC-specific: a bare `HttpClient.Get`/`Post` with no `Authorization` header, no acquired OAuth token, and no client certificate; a SOAP request whose credentials are blank, such as `SOAP Web Service Request Mgt.SetGlobals(..., '', BlankSecretText)`; or any request issued after `DisableHttpsCheck()` over plain HTTP (for example the EU VIES VAT service, whose default endpoint is `http://`). Because the BC platform HTTP stack buffers the entire response body before AL is handed the stream or `Temp Blob`, the whole payload is already in memory by the time AL parses it — so the response must be range- and shape-checked in AL *before* any of it is written to tax, VAT, customer, or vendor tables.
+When AL calls an external endpoint that does not authenticate *itself* to the client, the response is fully attacker-influenceable — cleartext MITM, a spoofed or compromised host, DNS/redirect games, or simply a misbehaving public service. Recognizing that a call is unauthenticated is the first review step, and the signals are BC-specific: a bare `HttpClient.Get`/`Post` with no `Authorization` header, no acquired OAuth token, and no client certificate; a SOAP request whose credentials are blank, such as `SOAP Web Service Request Mgt.SetGlobals(..., '', BlankSecretText)`; or any request issued after `DisableHttpsCheck()` over plain HTTP (for example the EU VIES VAT service, whose default endpoint is `http://`). Because the BC platform HTTP stack buffers the entire response body before AL is handed the stream or `Temp Blob`, the whole payload is already in memory by the time AL parses it — so the response must pass three checks in AL — **response size**, **schema compliance**, and **content integrity** — *before* any of it is written to tax, VAT, customer, or vendor tables.
 
 ## Best Practice
 
-Before parsing or trusting a response from an unauthenticated endpoint: (1) enforce a maximum size — reject when the buffered `Temp Blob` length or `Content-Length` exceeds a small cap sized to the expected payload; (2) validate the schema/shape — require the specific scalar nodes you expect, not merely "the body contains a truthy flag"; (3) enforce request-to-response integrity — when the protocol echoes the identifiers you queried (VIES echoes `countryCode`/`vatNumber`; a public-IP service echoes an IP string), require them to be present and to match the request, so a response carrying only `valid=true` cannot be accepted for an arbitrary input; (4) on rejection raise an `Error` and record a security audit via `Audit Log.LogAuditMessage(...)` plus telemetry. See sample: `validate-unauthenticated-response-before-use.good.al`. For validating the outbound target/host, see `validate-user-configurable-urls.md`; for authenticating outbound calls, see `prefer-oauth2-over-api-keys-for-external-http-calls.md`.
+Before parsing or trusting a response from an unauthenticated endpoint, apply all three of these checks before the payload reaches business logic: (1) **Response size** — reject when the buffered `Temp Blob` length or `Content-Length` exceeds a small cap sized to the expected payload; (2) **Schema compliance** — require the specific scalar nodes/fields you expect in the expected shape, not merely "the body contains a truthy flag"; (3) **Content integrity** — when the protocol echoes the identifiers you queried (VIES echoes `countryCode`/`vatNumber`; a public-IP service echoes an IP string), require them to be present and to match the request, so a response carrying only `valid=true` cannot be accepted for an arbitrary input. On any failing check, raise an `Error` and record a security audit via `Audit Log.LogAuditMessage(...)` plus telemetry. See sample: `validate-unauthenticated-response-before-use.good.al`. For validating the outbound target/host, see `validate-user-configurable-urls.md`; for authenticating outbound calls, see `prefer-oauth2-over-api-keys-for-external-http-calls.md`.
 
 ## Anti Pattern