Expand review skills to match the 6-domain knowledge corpus

The knowledge corpus now covers performance, security, privacy, upgrade,
style, and UI. Previously only two leaf reviewer skills existed
(al-performance-review, al-security-review), so four of the six domains
had knowledge with no skill sourcing from them. A community reader
landing in privacy/, upgrade/, style/, or ui/ would see articles with
no apparent consumer.

Three changes:

1. Move existing review skills into `microsoft/skills/review/`. The
   `review/` subfolder groups all review-kind skills together and leaves
   room for future non-review action skills at the `microsoft/skills/`
   level. Updates references in README.md, agent-consumption.md, and
   skills/entry.md to the new paths.

2. Add four new leaf reviewer skills — al-privacy-review,
   al-upgrade-review, al-style-review, al-ui-review — each following
   the same DO template as al-performance-review/al-security-review but
   sourcing from the corresponding knowledge domain. al-upgrade-review
   and al-ui-review return `not-applicable` when the diff contains no
   upgrade surface or no page files, respectively.

3. Update al-code-review to compose all six leaf skills and retarget
   the dangling references in every populated JSON example
   (`use-setloadfields.md`, `no-plaintext-secrets-in-telemetry.md`,
   `avoid-implicit-commit.md` — none of which exist in the corpus) to
   real knowledge files: `call-setloadfields-before-filters.md`,
   `use-secrettext-for-credentials.md`, `never-hardcode-secrets-in-al.md`.

Validator passes with 0 errors / 0 warnings.

microsoft/skills/review/al-security-review.md

@@ -0,0 +1,130 @@
+---
+kind: action-skill
+id: al-security-review
+version: 1
+title: AL security review
+description: Reviews AL source changes against security guidance from BCQuality.
+inputs: [pr-diff, file-path]
+outputs: [findings-report]
+bc-version: [all]
+technologies: [al]
+countries: [w1]
+application-area: [all]
+---
+
+# AL security review
+
+Reviews AL source changes against the `security` knowledge domain in BCQuality and emits a findings report. This is a leaf action skill: it invokes no sub-skills. It is one of the skills composed by `al-code-review`.
+
+An orchestrator invokes this skill with either a `pr-diff` (the standard PR-review entry point) or a `file-path` (single-file review). The skill produces a single JSON document conforming to the DO output contract.
+
+## Source
+
+Collect all knowledge files under `*/knowledge/security/**/*.md`, across every enabled layer (`/microsoft/`, `/community/`, `/custom/`). Relevance trims the result to the subset that applies.
+
+## Relevance
+
+Apply the frontmatter matching rules defined in READ (*Frontmatter matching semantics*) against the task context:
+
+- `bc-version` — the target BC version from the PR branch's `app.json` or the orchestrator-supplied version. If unavailable, the dimension is `unknown`.
+- `technologies` — `[al]`.
+- `countries` — the countries declared in the consuming app's `app.json`. Default to the orchestrator's configured context; if absent, `unknown`.
+- `application-area` — the union of application areas declared by the changed objects. Pass the actual set; do not substitute `[all]`. If the area cannot be determined from the changes, the dimension is `unknown`.
+
+Discard files that are not applicable. Retain conditionally applicable files (any dimension `unknown`) only when the orchestrator's configuration permits them; findings derived from those files MUST have `confidence` no higher than `medium`, AND the finding's `message` MUST name the dimension or dimensions that were unknown.
+
+## Worklist
+
+Narrow the relevant files to the subset that applies to the changes under review. For each relevant file, compute overlap against:
+
+- The changed AL object names and types — especially permission sets, codeunits handling authentication or authorization, objects touching `Isolated Storage`, `OAuth2` flows, web service endpoints, and API pages.
+- The changed procedures and triggers, weighted toward those that call `HttpClient`, write to telemetry, read or write secrets, manipulate record-level security, or bypass the permission model (for example, `Record.WritePermission`, direct table access from a non-owning app).
+- Tokens extracted from the diff that relate to security concerns (`IsolatedStorage`, `OAuth2`, `Secret`, `Password`, `Token`, `HttpClient`, `Permission`, `Session`, `UserSecurityId`, `Commit`).
+
+A file enters the candidate worklist when its `keywords` intersect the extracted tokens or its topic (derived from filename and Description) matches a changed object type.
+
+Once the candidate worklist is known, resolve layer-precedence conflicts per READ. Drop lower-precedence files whose normative guidance (`## Best Practice` or `## Anti Pattern`) directly contradicts a higher-precedence candidate, and record each dropped file in `suppressed` with `reason: "layer-precedence"`. Files that would have been candidates but are hidden because their layer is disabled in consumer configuration are recorded with `reason: "configuration"`. Files that never became candidates are NOT recorded in `suppressed`.
+
+When the post-conflict worklist is empty because no applicable security knowledge exists, or because configuration suppressed every candidate, emit `outcome: "no-knowledge"`. When the worklist is empty because no applicable security knowledge matched the changes, emit `outcome: "completed"` with an empty `findings` array.
+
+## Action
+
+For each worklist entry, evaluate the diff against the file's `## Best Practice` and `## Anti Pattern` sections. Emit findings as follows:
+
+- When the diff contains a clear match for an Anti Pattern, emit a finding with severity `major` or `blocker`, a message summarizing the anti-pattern, `location` pointing to the offending line or range, and a `references` entry pointing to the knowledge file. Use `blocker` only when the knowledge file states the anti-pattern violates a platform-level guarantee (for example, documented secret-handling rules, permission-model invariants, or data-protection requirements). When the file does not make such a claim, the ceiling is `major`.
+- When the diff contains code that contradicts a Best Practice without being a full anti-pattern, emit `minor` with the same reference shape.
+- When the skill cannot detect a violation but the file is clearly applicable to the change, emit `info` citing the file. Repository-wide observations MAY omit `location`.
+
+Set `confidence` to:
+
+- `high` when the detection is based on an unambiguous pattern match (identifier, syntax, object type).
+- `medium` when detection relies on heuristics or when any frontmatter dimension was `unknown`.
+- `low` when the finding is an advisory derived only from applicability.
+
+Outcome selection:
+
+- `completed` — the skill evaluated every worklist item; default when the skill finishes normally, including when the resulting `findings` array is empty.
+- `no-knowledge` — no applicable security knowledge survived Source, Relevance, configuration filtering, and conflict resolution. `findings` is empty.
+- `not-applicable` — the task context lacks an AL dimension (no AL changes in the diff, or `technologies` filter rejected the task).
+- `partial` — a time or token budget was hit before the worklist was exhausted. `summary.coverage` reflects the evaluated subset; `outcome-reason` explains the cause.
+- `failed` — an unrecoverable error occurred. `outcome-reason` is required.
+
+## Output
+
+Output conforms to the DO output contract. A populated example:
+
+```json
+{
+  "skill": { "id": "al-security-review", "version": 1 },
+  "outcome": "completed",
+  "summary": {
+    "counts": { "blocker": 1, "major": 0, "minor": 1, "info": 0 },
+    "coverage": { "worklist-size": 2, "items-evaluated": 2 }
+  },
+  "findings": [
+    {
+      "id": "microsoft/knowledge/security/use-secrettext-for-credentials.md",
+      "severity": "blocker",
+      "message": "A bearer token is declared as a Text parameter and passed through the HTTP request path as plain text. The referenced guidance requires credentials to flow as SecretText end-to-end.",
+      "location": {
+        "file": "src/Integration/ApiClient.Codeunit.al",
+        "line": 85,
+        "range": { "start-line": 85, "end-line": 89 }
+      },
+      "references": [
+        { "path": "microsoft/knowledge/security/use-secrettext-for-credentials.md" }
+      ],
+      "confidence": "high"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "microsoft/knowledge/security/never-hardcode-secrets-in-al.md",
+      "severity": "minor",
+      "message": "An API key is assigned from a string literal rather than retrieved from IsolatedStorage or Key Vault at runtime.",
+      "location": {
+        "file": "src/Integration/ApiClient.Codeunit.al",
+        "line": 201
+      },
+      "references": [
+        { "path": "microsoft/knowledge/security/never-hardcode-secrets-in-al.md" }
+      ],
+      "confidence": "medium"
+    }
+  ],
+  "suppressed": []
+}
+```
+
+The empty-corpus case — BCQuality's state until security knowledge files land — produces:
+
+```json
+{
+  "skill": { "id": "al-security-review", "version": 1 },
+  "outcome": "no-knowledge",
+  "summary": {
+    "counts": { "blocker": 0, "major": 0, "minor": 0, "info": 0 },
+    "coverage": { "worklist-size": 0, "items-evaluated": 0 }
+  },
+  "findings": [],
+  "suppressed": []
+}
+```