Complete AL review knowledge readiness (#108)

* Complete AL review knowledge readiness

Fill telemetry and Query coverage, strengthen thin review domains, correct audited content defects, and add deterministic cheap-model evaluation and reference-integrity safeguards.

Co-authored-by: Copilot App <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>

Copilot-Session: 9825b012-e653-496a-9310-c1f4b6f8ac27

* Generalize review fixture discovery

Derive smoke cases from the leaf, domain, and paired-sample conventions so new leaves require no scoring-contract changes. Keep only exceptional selection/context overrides and fail when retrieval metadata cannot rank the selected article.

Co-authored-by: Copilot App <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>

Copilot-Session: 9825b012-e653-496a-9310-c1f4b6f8ac27

* Preserve published field IDs in sample

Keep the existing Email and Contact Email field IDs unchanged, clarify that the sample represents an independent baseline, and use a local breaking-change rule for the generic smoke evaluation.

Co-authored-by: Copilot App <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>

Copilot-Session: 9825b012-e653-496a-9310-c1f4b6f8ac27

* Clarify published field identity rules

State explicitly that a published field keeps its ID, name, and type while a replacement is added as a separate field under an unused ID.

Co-authored-by: Copilot App <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>

Copilot-Session: 9825b012-e653-496a-9310-c1f4b6f8ac27

* Align field obsoletion sample baselines

Use Email field ID 3 as the shared baseline so the bad example demonstrates a same-ID rename while the good example retains the original field and adds a separate replacement.

Co-authored-by: Copilot App <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>

Copilot-Session: 9825b012-e653-496a-9310-c1f4b6f8ac27

---------

Co-authored-by: Jesper Schulz-Wedde <jesper.schulzwedde@microsoft.com>

microsoft/skills/review/al-security-review.md

@@ -39,10 +39,17 @@ Narrow the relevant files to the subset that applies to the changes under review
 
 - The changed AL object names and types — especially permission sets, codeunits handling authentication or authorization, objects touching `Isolated Storage`, `OAuth2` flows, web service endpoints, API pages, event publishers, and RecordRef helpers.
 - The changed procedures and triggers, weighted toward those that call `HttpClient`, validate or compose URLs, write to telemetry, read or write secrets, unwrap SecretText, manipulate record-level security, expose var Boolean guard parameters, or bypass the permission model (for example, `RecordRef.Open`, `Record.WritePermission`, direct table access from a non-owning app).
-- Tokens extracted from the diff that relate to security concerns (`IsolatedStorage`, `SetEncrypted`, `OAuth2`, `SecretText`, `Unwrap`, `NonDebuggable`, `Password`, `Token`, `HttpClient`, `Uri`, `AreURIsHaveSameHost`, `IsValidURIPattern`, `RecordRef`, `RecordId`, `Open`, `IntegrationEvent`, `SkipValidation`, `HasAccess`, `Permission`, `UserSecurityId`, `Commit`).
+- Tokens extracted from the diff that relate to security concerns (`IsolatedStorage`, `SetEncrypted`, `OAuth2`, `SecretText`, `Unwrap`, `NonDebuggable`, `Password`, `Token`, `HttpClient`, `Uri`, `AreURIsHaveSameHost`, `IsValidURIPattern`, `RecordRef`, `RecordId`, `TransferFields`, `Codeunit.Run`, `Access = Internal`, `internalsVisibleTo`, `Open`, `IntegrationEvent`, `SkipValidation`, `HasAccess`, `Permission`, `UserSecurityId`, `Commit`).
 
 A file enters the candidate worklist when its `keywords` intersect the extracted tokens or its topic (derived from the index entry's `path`, `title`, and `description`) matches a changed object type. Read an article's full file — its `## Best Practice` / `## Anti Pattern` bodies — only after it makes the worklist; candidate selection uses the index alone.
 
+Always worklist `internal-access-is-not-a-security-boundary.md` when changed comments or code rely on `Access = Internal` or `internalsVisibleTo` to protect a sensitive operation, or an internal `OnRun` codeunit performs privileged work without an independent authorization boundary. Do not flag `internal` used only to keep implementation details out of the supported API.
+
+For secret values, select the most specific sink owner:
+
+- When a `Text`/`Code` credential is declared, passed, returned, or unwrapped without a visible HTTP URI/header/body sink, use `secrettext-for-credentials.md`.
+- When that value is interpolated into a URI, authorization header, or HTTP body and sent through `HttpClient`, use `secrettext-with-httpclient.md` as the primary finding. It supersedes the generic credential-type article at that location; keep the latter only as a supporting reference when useful.
+
 Once the candidate worklist is known, resolve layer-precedence conflicts per READ. Drop lower-precedence files whose normative guidance (`## Best Practice` or `## Anti Pattern`) directly contradicts a higher-precedence candidate, and record each dropped file in `suppressed` with `reason: "layer-precedence"`. Files that would have been candidates but are hidden because their layer is disabled in consumer configuration are recorded with `reason: "configuration"`. Files that never became candidates are NOT recorded in `suppressed`.
 
 When the post-conflict worklist is empty because no applicable security knowledge exists, or because configuration suppressed every candidate, emit `outcome: "no-knowledge"`. When the worklist is empty because no applicable security knowledge matched the changes, emit `outcome: "completed"` with an empty `findings` array.
@@ -53,7 +60,7 @@ For each worklist entry, evaluate the diff against the file's `## Best Practice`
 
 - When the diff contains a clear match for an Anti Pattern, emit a finding with severity `major` or `blocker`, a message summarizing the anti-pattern, `location` pointing to the offending line or range, and a `references` entry pointing to the knowledge file. Use `blocker` only when the knowledge file states the anti-pattern violates a platform-level guarantee (for example, documented secret-handling rules, permission-model invariants, or data-protection requirements). When the file does not make such a claim, the ceiling is `major`.
 - When the diff contains code that contradicts a Best Practice without being a full anti-pattern, emit `minor` with the same reference shape.
-- When the skill cannot detect a violation but the file is clearly applicable to the change, emit `info` citing the file. Repository-wide observations MAY omit `location`.
+- Applicability alone is not a finding. Emit `info` only for a concrete, non-actionable observation the article explicitly defines; otherwise emit nothing when no violation is present.
 
 Set `confidence` to: