Seed security knowledge corpus (16 articles + 30 AL samples)

Converts Jesper's existing AL security-review prompt into BCQuality seed
knowledge articles so the al-security-review leaf has a real corpus to
match against. Mirrors the performance seed phase.

Articles under microsoft/knowledge/security/ (16):
- Permission model: follow-least-privilege-in-permission-sets,
  use-indirect-permissions-for-elevated-access,
  use-inherent-permissions-to-grant-minimal-access
- Secrets: never-hardcode-secrets-in-al,
  use-isolated-storage-for-module-and-company-secrets,
  prefer-azure-key-vault-for-production-secrets,
  use-secrettext-for-credentials, use-secrettext-with-httpclient,
  compose-secrets-with-secretstrsubstno,
  use-nondebuggable-when-parsing-secrets
- External calls: require-https-for-external-calls,
  set-timeouts-for-external-calls, do-not-put-credentials-in-urls
- Error handling: avoid-sensitive-data-in-error-messages,
  do-not-swallow-security-errors-silently
- Extensibility: do-not-expose-sensitive-data-in-event-publishers

Paired AL samples under samples/security/<slug>/{bad,good}.al, object
IDs 50200-50231 (no overlap with performance 50100-50140).

Rubber-duck findings addressed:
- HttpClient secret-URI: SetSecretRequestUri is on HttpRequestMessage
  (not HttpClient). Rewrote use-secrettext-with-httpclient and its
  good sample to use HttpRequestMessage + HttpClient.Send.
- InherentPermissions only grants access to same-extension objects;
  the sample now defines its own table 50230 "Sec Sample Lookup" and
  grants 'r' on that, not on Database::Customer.
- Reworked compose-secrets-with-secretstrsubstno bad.al away from
  Format(SecretText) (unreliable) to a plain Text+StrSubstNo anti-
  pattern.
- Moved normative guidance out of Description in three articles
  (compose-secrets-..., prefer-azure-key-vault-..., use-inherent-...)
  so it sits in Best Practice / Anti Pattern per READ contract.
- Added a companion helper codeunit (50231) to the indirect-permissions
  good sample so it actually demonstrates the controlled write path.
- Rebuilt the event-publisher good/bad pair on the same ExportCustomer
  scenario so the contrast is the shape of the event signature, not a
  different event.

Also: broaden samples/README.md object-ID range note to 50100-50299.

Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>

microsoft/knowledge/security/follow-least-privilege-in-permission-sets.md

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+---
+bc-version: [26..28]
+domain: security
+keywords: [permissionset, least-privilege, rimd, tabledata]
+technologies: [al]
+countries: [w1]
+application-area: [all]
+---
+
+# Follow least privilege in permission sets
+
+> **Seed article.** Converted from an existing security-review prompt to bootstrap the BCQuality security corpus. Domain stewards should expand, restructure, and refine as needed.
+
+## Description
+
+Permission sets define the tabledata and object rights granted to every user or role assigned to them. A permission set that grants RIMD on tabledata * hands every caller full control over every table the extension exposes, which is never the shape of access any real role requires. Over-broad permission sets are a persistent source of privilege-escalation risk: once assigned, they are rarely audited.
+
+## Best Practice
+
+Enumerate the specific tabledata objects a role needs and grant only the letters (R, I, M, D) that role genuinely uses. A sales order-entry role typically needs RIM on Sales Header, RIMD on Sales Line, and R on Customer — not blanket RIMD. Permission sets SHOULD be granular and role-shaped; a single permission set that covers every role in an extension is a design smell.
+
+See sample: `samples/security/follow-least-privilege-in-permission-sets/good.al`.
+
+## Anti Pattern
+
+Granting `tabledata * = RIMD` (or any wildcard with I, M, or D) in a permission set. This bypasses any meaningful separation of duties the extension could enforce and gives unreviewed code paths the ability to insert, modify, and delete on any table.
+
+See sample: `samples/security/follow-least-privilege-in-permission-sets/bad.al`.
+